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Abstract. We propose DAB – a data-aware extension of the BPMN de-
facto standard with the ability of operating over case and persistent data
(partitioned into a read-only catalog and a read-write repository), and
that balances between expressiveness and the possibility of supporting
parameterized verification of safety properties on top of it. In particular,
we take inspiration from the literature on verification of artifact systems,
and consider verification problems where safety properties are checked
irrespectively of the content of the read-only catalog, possibly considering
an unbounded number of active cases and tuples in the catalog and
repository. Such problems are tackled using fully implemented array-
based backward reachability techniques belonging to the well-established
tradition of SMT model checking. We also identify relevant classes of
DABs for which the backward reachability procedure implemented in
the MCMT array-based model checker is sound and complete, and then
further strengthen such classes to ensure termination.
1 Introduction
In recent years, increasing attention has been given to multi-perspective models
of business processes that strive to capture the interplay between the process
and data dimensions [26,25]. The corresponding development of formal models
and foundational results on their verification has flourished, but mainly focusing
on data-centric approaches [28,3] that are quite different in nature from conven-
tional notations. In parallel, conventional approaches such as the de-facto BPMN
standard have been extended with various forms of data, though with a main fo-
cus on conceptual modeling and enactment [22,11,8], without considering formal
verification. More on the formal side, many approaches within this line consider-
ing Petri nets as the main control-flow backbone for capturing the process, and
enriching them with data locally carried by tokens [27,19,23], case data with
different datatypes [12], and/or persistent relational data manipulated with the
full power of FOL/SQL [13,24]. While this latter family of approaches qualify
well to capture BPMN enriched with persistent data (such as [22,8]), they place
two assumptions on verification: first, that the process is studied by considering
a fully-specified, initial instance of the underlying database; second, that only
boundedly many tuples can be stored in the database. Such approaches have not
yet been applied to formalize BPMN with data, and do not lend themselves to
capture parameterized verification problems that can ascertain the correctness
of the process without imposing the aforementioned limitations.
In this work, we attack this open challenge and propose a data-aware exten-
sion of BPMN, called data-aware BPMN (DAB), equipped with the ability of
querying and operating over case and persistent data (partitioned into a read-
only catalog and a read-write repository). The approach balances expressiveness
with the possibility of supporting parameterized verification of safety properties.
In particular, we take inspiration from the literature on the verification of artifact
systems [28], and in particular the frameworks in [20,6], considering verification
problems where safety properties are checked irrespectively of the content of
the read-only catalog, and possibly considering an unbounded number of active
cases and tuples in the catalog and repository.
We study this problem by establishing a bridge between our approach to
business process modeling, and the line of research where techniques based on
Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) are employed to attack the verification of
infinite-state array-based systems – originally introduced in [16,17] to handle the
verification of distributed systems (parameterized on the number of interacting
processes). In particular, we rely on novel foundational results on the verification
of artifact-centric systems via array-based systems [4,6], which have been fully
implemented in the state-of-the-art mcmt SMT symbolic model checker [18].
By exploiting this formal basis, we identify two relevant classes of DABs for
which the backward reachability procedure implemented in the MCMT array-
based model checker is sound and complete. This guarantees that if the pro-
cedure terminates, it produces a correct judgement. We then introduce further
conditions that, by carefully controlling the interplay between the process and
data components, guarantee the termination of the procedure, in turn witness-
ing decidability. Such conditions are expressed as syntactic restrictions over the
DAB under study, thus providing a concrete, BPMN-grounded counterpart of
the conditions imposed in [20,4,6] towards decidability.
These termination results obtained by translating DABs into the array-based
artifact systems studied in [4,6]. The translation can then be straightforwardly
implemented making it possible to effectively verify DABs using mcmt.
This article builds upon [5], extending it in two respects. On the one hand,
while [5] focuses on the verification of DABs considering a single, running case, we
consider here the possibility of (unboundedly many) cases running concurrently.
On the other hand, we provide full proofs of the technical results, including those
from [5] and those specifically introduced in this extended version.
2 Data-aware BPMN
We start by describing our formal model of data-aware BPMN processes (DABs).
We focus here on private, single-pool processes. Incoming messages are therefore
handled as pure nondeterministic events. The model combines a wide range
of (block-structured) BPMN control-flow constructs with task, event-reaction,
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and condition logic that inspect and modify persistent as well as case data.
The combination achieves a balanced trade off between the expressive power of
the resulting integrated model, and the possibility of carrying out sophisticated
forms of parameterized verification, which will be tackled in Section 3. When
going through the modeling features of DAB, it is then important to remember
that if something is not supported, it is because it would hamper soundness and
completeness of SMT-based (parameterized) verification.
First, some preliminary notation. We consider a set S = Sv⊎Sid of (semantic)
types, consisting of primitive types Sv accounting for data objects, and id types
Sid accounting for identifiers. We assume that each type S ∈ S comes with
a (possibly infinite) domain DS , a special constant undefS ∈ DS to denote
an undefined value in that domain, and a type-wise equality operator =S . We
omit the type and simply write undef and = when clear from the context.
We do not consider here additional type-specific predicates (such as comparison
and arithmetic operators for numerical primitive types); these will be added in
future work (cf. Section 5 for a discussion on this). In the following, we simply
use typed as a shortcut for S-typed. We also denote by D the overall domain
of objects and identifiers (i.e., the union of all domains in S). We consider a
countably infinite set V of typed variables. Given a variable or object x, we may
explicitly indicate that x has type S by writing x : S. We omit types whenever
clear from the context, or irrelevant. We compactly indicate a possibly empty
tuple 〈x1, . . . , xn〉 of variables as ~x, and with slight abuse of notation, we write
~x ⊆ ~y if all variables in ~x also appear in ~y.
2.1 The Data Schema
Consistently with the BPMN standard, we consider two main forms of data: case
data1, instantiated and manipulated on a per-case basis; persistent data (cf. data
store references in BPMN), accounting for global data that are accessed by all
cases. For simplicity, case data are defined at the whole process level, and are
directly visible by all tasks and subprocesses (without requiring the specification
of input-output bindings and the like).
To account for persistent data, we consider relational databases. We describe
relation schemas by using the named perspective, i.e., by assigning a dedicated
typed attribute to each component (i.e., column) of a relation schema. Also for
an attribute, we use the notation a : S to explicitly indicate its type.
Definition 1. A relation schema is a pair R = 〈N,A〉, where: (i) N = R.name
is the relation name; (ii) A = R.attrs is a nonempty tuple of attributes. We call
|A| the arity of R. ⊳
We assume that distinct relation schemas use distinct names, blurring the dis-
tinction between the two notions (i.e., we set R.name = R). We also use the
predicate notation R(A) to represent a relation schema 〈R,A〉.
1 These are called data objects in BPMN, but we prefer to use the term case data to
avoid name clashes with the formal notions.
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Data schema. We start by defining the catalog, i.e., a read-only, persistent
storage of data that is not modified during the execution of the process.
Definition 2. A catalog Cat is a set of relation schemas satisfying the following
requirements:
(single-column primary key) Every relation schema R is such that the first
attribute in R.attrs has type in Sid, and denotes the primary key of the
relation; we refer to such attribute using the dot notation R.id.
(non-ambiguity of primary keys) for every pair R1 and R2 of distinct rela-
tion schemas in Cat , we have that the types of R1 .id and R2 .id are different.
(foreign keys) for every relation schema R ∈ Cat and non-id attribute a ∈
R.attrs \R.id with type S ∈ Sid, there exists a relation schema R2 ∈ R such
that the type of R2 .id is S; a is hence a foreign key referring to R2. ⊳
We now define the data schema of a BPMN process, which combines a catalog
with: (i) a persistent data repository, consisting of updatable relation schemas
possibly referring to the catalog; (ii) a set of case variables, constituting local
data carried by each process case.
Definition 3. A data schema D is a tuple 〈Cat ,CType,Repo,X 〉, where
(i) Cat = D.cat is a catalog, (ii) CType = D.ctype ∈ Sid is a special case
identifier type, (iii) Repo = D.repo is a set of relation schemas called repos-
itory, and (iv) X = D.cvars ⊂ V is a finite set of typed variables called case
variables, such that:
• CType is disjoint from all identifier types used in Cat;
• for every relation schema R ∈ Repo and every attribute a ∈ R.attrs whose type
is S ∈ Sid, there exists R ∈ Cat ∪ {CType} such that the type of R.id is S;
• for every case variable x ∈ X whose type is S ∈ Sid, there exists R ∈ Cat ∪
{CType} such that the type of R.id is S;
• D contains an special case variable self :CType that is never modified, and that
keeps track, for a case, of the corresponding case identifier. ⊳
We use bold-face to distinguish a case variable x from a “normal” variable x. It
is worth noting that relation schemas in the repository are not equipped with an
explicit primary key, and thus they cannot reference each other, but may contain
foreign keys pointing to the catalog or the case identifiers. This is essential
towards soundness and completeness of SMT-based verification of DABs. It will
be clear how tuples can be inserted and removed from the repository once we
will introduce updates.
At runtime, a data snapshot of a data schema consists of three components:
• An immutable catalog instance, i.e., a fixed set of tuples for each relation
schema contained therein, so that the primary and foreign keys are satisfied.
• A case map whose keys are the identifiers of active or completed cases (i.e.,
elements of the case identifier type), and whose values are assignments of
the case variables to corresponding values (satisfying the foreign keys when
pointing to identifiers in the catalog). Each entry then indicates, for a given
case, which are the current values for the case variables of that case.
• A repository instance, i.e., a set of tuples for for each relation schema contained
therein, so that the foreign key constraints pointing to the catalog or the case
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map keys are satisfied. Each tuple is associated to a distinct primary key that
is not explicitly accessible.
Example 1. We consider a simplified example of a job hiring process in a com-
pany. We describe here the data schema Dh used to store data about job hirings
and their corresponding applications. The catalog Dh.cat consists of the follow-
ing relation schemas:
• JobCategory(Jcid:jobcatID) contains the different job categories available in
the company (e.g., programmer, analyst, and the like) - we just store here the
identifiers of such categories;
• User(Uid:userID, Name:StringName, Age:NumAge) stores data about users
registered to the company website, and who are potentially interested in job
positions offered by the company.
Each case of the process is about a job. Jobs are identified by the type jobId.
To manage key information about the applications submitted for the various
job hirings, including data on users, the score they receive after having been
interviewed and their eligibility, the company employs the repository D.repo
that consists of one relation schema
Application(Jid:jobId, Jcid:jobcatID, Uid:userID, Name:StringName, Age:NumAge,
Score:NumScore, Eligible:Bool)
Notice that NumScore is a finite-domain type containing 100 values in the range
[1, 100], and it is used to assign an overall score to each candidate application.
For readability, we use the usual predicates <, >, and = to compare variables
of type NumScore: this is syntactic sugar and does not require to introduce rigid
predicates in our framework.
Since each posted job is created using a dedicated portal, its corresponding
data do not have to be stored persistently and thus can be maintained just for
a given case. At the same time, some specific values have to be moved from a
specific case to the repository and vice-versa. This is done by resorting to the
following case variables D.cvars: (i) jcid : jobcatID references a job type from the
catalog, matching the type of job associated to the case; (ii) uid : userID, name :
StringName and age : NumAge respectively reference the identifier, name, and
age of a user who is applying for the job associated to the case; (iii) result : Bool
indicates whether the user identified by uid is eligible for winning the position
or not; (iv) result : Bool indicates whether the user identified by uid qualifies
for directly getting the job (without the need of carrying out a comparative
evaluation of all applicants); (v) winner : userID contains the identifier of the
applicant winning the position; (vi) tPassed : StringDate contains special strings
symbolically indicating the current temporal phase of the case in relation with
its creation time. The last variable is not essential for the progression of job
hirings through the process, but it is useful to formulate verification properties.⊳
Querying the data schema. To inspect the data contained in a snapshot, we
need suitable query languages operating over the data schema of that snapshot.
In the following, we assume that queries are well-typed, i.e., sorts of their ele-
ments are duly matched (this can be easily checked by scanning the query). We
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start by considering boolean conditions over (case) variables. These conditions
will be attached to choice points in the process.
Definition 4. A condition is a formula of the form ϕ ::= (x = y) | ¬ϕ | ϕ1∧ϕ2,
where x and y are variables from V or constant objects from D. If in ϕ negation
is restricted to be only in front of atoms, ϕ is called a cubical condition. ⊳
We make use of the standard abbreviation ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 = ¬(¬ϕ1 ∧ ¬ϕ2).
We now extend conditions to also access the data stored in the catalog
and repository, and to ask for data objects subject to constraints. We consider
the well-known language of unions of conjunctive queries with atomic negation,
which correspond to unions of select-project-join SQL queries with table filters.
Definition 5. A conjunctive query with filters over a data component D is a
formula of the form Q ::= ϕ | R(x1, . . . , xn) | ¬R(x1, . . . , xn) | Q1 ∧ Q2, where
ϕ is a cubical condition, R ∈ D.cat ∪ D.repo is a relation schema of arity n,
and x1, . . . , xn are variables from V (including D.cvars) or constant objects from
D. We denote by free(Q) the set of variables occurring in Q that are not case
variables in D.cvars. ⊳
Definition 6. A guard G over a data component D is an expression of the
form q(~x) ←
∨n
i=1Qi, where: (i) q(~x) is the head of the guard with answer
variables ~x; (ii) each Qi is a conjunctive query with filters over D; (iii) for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, ~x ⊆ free(Qi). We denote by casevars(G) ⊆ D.cvars the set of
case variables used in G, and by normvars(G) =
⋃
i∈{1,...,n} free(Qi) the other
variables used in G. ⊳
Definition 7. A guard G over a data component D is repo-free if none of its
atoms queries a relation schema from D.repo. ⊳
Notice that going beyond this guard query language (e.g., by introducing
universal quantification) would hamper the soundness and completeness of SMT-
based verification over the resulting DABs. We will come back to this important
aspect in the conclusion.
As anticipated before, this language can be seen as a standard query language
to retrieve data from a snapshot, but also as a mechanism to identify the allowed
combinations of data objects that can be injected into the process from the
external environment. For example, considering a case variable x of type string,
a simple guard Input(y:string, z:string)→ y 6= x∧y 6= z returns all pairs of strings
that are different from each other, and so that the second string is different from
that stored in the case variable x. Picking an answer in this (infinite) set of pairs
can be consequently seen as a (constrained) user decision on which values to
input for y and z. We elaborate more on this in Section 2.2.
2.2 Tasks, Events, and Impact on Data
We now formalize how the process can access and update the data component
when executing a task or reacting to the trigger of an external event.
The update logic. We start by discussing how data maintained in a snapshot
can be subject to change while executing the process.
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Definition 8. Given a data schema D, an update specification α is a pair
〈G,E〉, where: (i) G = α.pre is a guard over D of the form q(~x) ← Q, called
precondition; (ii) E = α.eff is an effect rule that changes the content of case
variables or that of the repository, as described next. Each effect rule has one of
the following forms:
(Insert&Set) INSERT ~u INTO R AND SET x1 = v1, . . . ,xn = vn, where: (i) ~u,~v
are variables in ~x or constant objects from D; (ii) ~x ∈ D.cvars \ {self} are
distinct case variables different from self ; (iii) R is a relation schema from
D.repo whose arity (and types) match ~u. Either the INSERT or AND SET parts
may be omitted, obtaining a pure (repository) Insert rule or (case variable)
Set rule.
(Delete&Set) DEL ~u FROM R AND SET x1 = v1, . . . ,xn = vn, where: (i) ~u,~v are
variables in ~x or constant objects from D; ; (ii) ~x ∈ D.cvars \ {self}; (iii) R
is a relation schema from D.repo whose arity (and types) match ~u. As in
the previous rule type, the AND SET part may be omitted, obtaining a pure
(repository) Delete rule.
(Conditional update) UPDATE R(~v) IF ψ(~u,~v) THEN η1 ELSE η2, where: (i) ~u
is a tuple containing variables in ~x or constant objects from D; ; (ii) ψ is a
repo-free guard (called filter) (iii) ~v is a tuple of new variables, i.e., such that
~v ∩ (~u ∪ D.cvars) = ∅; (iv) ηi is either an atomic formula of the form R(~u′)
with ~u′ a tuple of elements from ~x∪D∪~v, or a nested IF . . . THEN . . . ELSE. ⊳
As stated in the definition, self is never explicitly set by any of the effect rules.
We now comment on the semantics of update specifications. An update spec-
ification α is executable in a given data snapshot if there is at least one answer
to the precondition α.pre in that snapshot. If this is the case, then the process
executor(s) can nondeterministically decide which answer to pick so as to bind
the answer variables of α.pre to corresponding data objects in D. This confirms
the interpretation discussed in Section 2.1 for which the answer variables of α.pre
can be seen as constrained user inputs in case multiple bindings are available.
Once a specific binding for the answer variables is selected, the corresponding
effect rule α.eff, instantiated using that binding, is issued. How this affects the
current data snapshot depends on which effect rule is adopted.
If α.eff is an insert&set rule, the binding is used to simultaneously insert a
tuple in one of the repository relations, and update some of the case variables –
with the implicit assumption that those not explicitly mentioned in the SET part
maintain their current values. Since repository relations do not have an explicit
primary key, two possible semantics can be attached to the insertion of a tuple
~u in the instance of a repository relation R:
(multiset insertion) Upon insertion, ~u gets implicitly assigned to a fresh pri-
mary key. The insertion then always results in the genuine addition of the
tuple to the current instance of R, even in the case where the tuple already
exists there.
(set insertion) In this case, R comes not only with its implicit primary key,
but also with an additional, genuine key constraint defined over a subset
K ⊆ R.attrs of its attributes. Upon insertion, if there already exists a tuple
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in the current instance of R that agrees with ~u on K, then that tuple is
updated according to ~u. If no such tuple exists, then as in the previous case
~u gets implicitly assigned to a fresh primary key, and inserted into the current
instance of R. By default, if no explicit key is defined over R, then the entire
set of attributes R.attrs is considered as a key, consequently enforcing a set
semantics for insertion.
Example 2. We continue the job hiring example, by considering two update
specifications of type insert&set. When a new case is created, the first update is
about indicating what is the category of job associated to the case. This is done
through the update specification InsJobCat, where:
– InsJobCat.pre , GetJobType(jt) ← JobCategory(jt) selects a job category
from the corresponding catalog relation;
– InsJobCat.eff , SET jcid = jt assigns the selected job category jt to the
case variable jcid.
When the case receives an application for its associated job, the user-related
case variables are filled with the data of the user submitting the application -
picked from the corresponding User catalog relation. This is done via the update
specification InsUser, where:
InsUser.pre , GetUser(u, n, a)← User(u, n, a)
InsUser.eff , SET uid = u,name = n, age = a
A different usage of precondition, resembling a pure external choice, is the update
specification CheckQual to handle a quick evaluation of the candidate and chec
whether she has such a high profile qualifying her to directly get an offer:
CheckQual.pre , IsQualified(q : Bool)← true
CheckQual.eff , SET qualif = q
As an example of insertion rule, we consider the situation where the candidate
whose data are currently stored in the case variables has not been directly judged
as qualified. She is consequently subject to a more fine-grained evaluation of her
application, resulting in a score that is then registered in the repository (together
with the applicant data). This is done via the Reg<eval specification:
EvalApp.pre , GetScore(s : NumScore)← 1 ≤ s ∧ s ≤ 100
EvalApp.eff , INSERT 〈self , jcid,uid,name, age, s, undef〉 INTO Application
Here, the insertion uses the applicant data currently stored in the corresponding
case variables, the selected score, and undef eligibility (which is then assessed
in a consequent step of the process). These objects are correlated to the case
identifier, so as to keep track of the relationship between the application and
the job to which the application has been submitted. This is essential, as the
same user may apply for different jobs. Notice that, by adopting the multiset
insertion semantics, the same user may even apply multiple times for the same
job. With a set insertion semantics, one could instead ensure that each user can
apply at most once to the same job, by indicating that the first two components
of Application form a key. ⊳
If α.eff is a delete&set rule, then the executability of the update is subject
to the fact that the tuple ~u selected by the binding and to be removed from
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R, is actually present in the current instance of R. If so, the binding is used to
simultaneously delete ~u from R and update some of the case variables – with the
implicit assumption that those not explicitly mentioned in the SET part maintain
their current values.
Finally, a conditional update rule applies, tuple by tuple, a bulk operation
over the content of R. For each tuple in R, if it passes the filter associated to the
rule, then the tuple is updated according to the THEN part, whereas if the filter
evaluates to false, the tuple is updated according to the ELSE part.
Example 3. Continuing with our running example, we now consider the update
specification MarkE handling the situation where no candidate has been directly
considered as qualified, and so the eligibility of all received (and evaluated)
applications has to be assessed. Here we consider that each application is eligible
if and only if its evaluation resulted in a score greater than 80. Technically,
MarkE.pre is a true precondition, and:
MarkE.eff , UPDATE Application(j, jc, u, n, a, s, e)
IF j = self ∧ s > 80 THEN Application(j, jc, u, n, a, s, true)
ELSE IF j = self ∧ s ≤ 80 THEN Application(j, jc, u, n, a, s, false)
ELSE Application(j, jc, u, n, a, s, e)
The update logic realized by MarkE.eff is the following: (i) applications sent for
the considered job and with a score > 80 are marked as eligible; (ii) other appli-
cations sent for the considered job are marked as not eligible; (iii) applications
sent for other jobs are left unaltered.
If there is at least one eligible candidate, she can be selected as a winner using
the SelWinner update specification, which deletes the selected winner tuple from
Application , and transfers its content to the corresponding case variables (also
ensuring that the winner case variable is set to the applicant id). Technically:
SelWinner.pre , GetWinner(j, jc, u, n, a, s, e)← Application(j, jc, u, n, a, s, e)
∧j = self ∧ e = true
SelWinner.eff , DEL 〈j, jc, u, n, a, s, e〉 FROM Application
AND SET jcid = jc,uid = u,name = n,
age = a,winner = jc, result = e
Deleting the tuple is useful in the situation where the selected winner may refuse
the job, and consequently should not be considered again if a new winner selec-
tion is carried out. To keep such tuple in the repository, one would just need to
remove the DEL part from EvalApp.eff. ⊳
The task/event logic. We now substantiate how the update logic is used to
specify the task/event logic within a DAB process. The first important observa-
tion, which does not relate to our specific design choice for the update logic, but
is inherently present whenever the process control flow is enriched with relational
data, is that update effects manipulating the repository must be executed in an
atomic, non-interruptible way. This is essential to ensure that insertions/dele-
tions into/from the repository are applied on the same data snapshot where
the precondition is checked. This cannot be guaranteed if the precondition and
effect occur in different moments, as they may nondeterministically interleave
9
with other update specifications potentially operating over the same portion of
the repository. This is why in our approach we consider two types of task: atomic
and nonatomic. This goes beyond the BPMN standard, where generic tasks are
implicitly assumed to be nonatomic.
Each atomic task/catching event is associated to a corresponding update
specification. In the case of tasks, the specification precondition indicates under
which circumstances the task can be enacted, and the specification effect how
enacting the task impacts on the underlying data snapshot. In the case of events,
the specification precondition constrains the data payload that comes with the
event (possibly depending on the data snapshot, which is global and therefore
accessible also from the perspective of an external event trigger), and the speci-
fication effect how reacting to a triggered event impacts on the underlying data
snapshot. More concretely, this is realized according to the following lifecycle.
The task/event is initially idle, i.e., quiescent. When the progression of
a case reaches an idle task/event, such a task/event becomes enabled. An
enabled task/event may nondeterministically fire depending on the choice of
the process executor(s). Upon firing, a binding satisfying the precondition of
the update specification associated to the task/event is selected, consequently
grounding and applying the corresponding effect. At the same time, the lifecycle
moves from enabled to compl. Finally, a compl task/event triggers the progres-
sion of its case depending on the process-control flow, simultaneously bringing
the task/event back to the idle state (which would then make it possible for the
task to be executed again later on within the same case, if the process control-
flow dictates so).
The lifecycle of a nonatomic task diverges in two crucial respects. First of all,
upon firing it moves from enabled to active, and later on nondeterministically
from active to compl (thus having a duration). The precondition of its update
specification is checked and bound to one of the available answers when the
task becomes active, while the corresponding effect is applied when the task
becomes compl. Since these two transitions occur asynchronously, to avoid the
aforementioned transactional issues we assume that the effect operates, in this
context, only on case variables (and not on the repository).
2.3 Process Schema
A process schema consists of a block-structured BPMN diagram, enriched with
conditions and update effects expressed over a given data schema, according to
what described in the previous sections. As for the control flow, we consider
a wide range of block-structured patterns compliant with the standard, taking
inspiration and expanding those in [21]. We focus on private BPMN processes,
thereby handling incoming messages in a pure nondeterministic way. So we do
for timer events, nondeterministically accounting for their expiration without en-
tering into their metric temporal semantics. Focusing on block-structured com-
ponents helps us in obtaining a direct, execution semantics, and a consequent
modular and clean translation of various BPMN constructs (including boundary
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events and exception handling). However, it is important to stress that our ap-
proach would seamlessly work also for non-structured processes where each case
introduces boundedly many tokens.
As usual, blocks are recursively decomposed into sub-blocks, the leaves being
task or empty blocks. Depending on its type, a block may come with one or more
nested blocks, and be associated with other elements, such as conditions, types
of the involved events, and the like. We consider a wide range of blocks, covering
basic, flow, and exception handling patterns. They are reported in Appendix A.
Figure 1 gives an idea about what is covered by our approach. With these blocks
at hand, we finally obtain the full definition of a DAB.
Definition 9. A DAB M is a pair 〈D,P〉 where D is a data schema, and P
is a root process block such that all conditions and update effects attached to P
and its descendant blocks are expressed over D. ⊳
Example 4. The full hiring job process is shown in Figured 1, using the update
effects described in Examples 2 and 2. Intuitively, the process works as follows. A
new case for the process is created whenever a new job is posted. The case enters
into a looping subprocess where it expects candidates to apply. Specifically, the
case waits for an incoming application, or for an external message signalling
that the hiring has to be stopped (e.g., because too much time has passed from
the posting). Whenever an application is received, the CV of the candidate
is evaluated, with two possible outcomes. The first outcome indicates that the
candidate directly qualifies for the position, hence no further applications should
be considered. In this case, the process continues by declaring the candidate as
winner, and making an offer to her. The second outcome of the CV evaluation is
instead that the candidate does not directly qualify. A more detailed evaluation is
then carried out, assigning a score to the application and storing the outcome into
the process repository, then waiting for additional applications to come. When
the application management subprocess is stopped (which we model through
an error so as to test various types of blocks in the experiments reported in
Section 4), the applications present in the working memory are all processed
in parallel, declaring which candidates are eligible and which not depending on
their scores. Among the eligible ones, a winner is then selected, making an offer
to her. We implicitly assume here that at least one applicant is eligible. We can
remove this assumption and also handle the case where no eligible applicant
exists for a job, by simply introducing (and consequently using) a boolean case
variable that, upon the application evaluation, is set to true if the obtained score
makes the application eligible. ⊳
As customary, each block has a lifecycle that, case by case, indicates the
current state of the block, and how it can be evolved depending on the specific
semantics of the block, and the evolution of its inner blocks. In Section 2.2 we
have already characterized the lifecycle of tasks and catch events. For the other
blocks, we continue to use the standard states idle, enabled, active and compl.
We use the very same rules of execution described in the BPMN standard to
regulate the progression of blocks through such states, taking advantage from
the fact that, being the process block-structured, only one instance of a block
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Job posted
[InsJobCat]
App. received
[InsUser]
Stop Stopped
Evaluate
CV
[CheckQual]
qualif =
true
Evaluate
Application
[EvalApp]
qualif =
false
Stopped
Decide
Eligible
Candidates
[MarkE]
Select
Winner
[SelWinner]
Assign
Winner
Make
Offer
Fig. 1. The job hiring process. Elements in squared brackets indicate the up-
date specifications attached to the corresponding tasks/events, and formalized
as shown in Examples 2 and 3.
can be enabled/active at a given time for a given case. For example, the lifecycle
of a sequence block S with nested blocks B1 and B2 can be described as follows
(considering that the transitions of S from idle to enabled and from compl
back to idle are inductively regulated by its parent block): (i) if S is enabled,
then it becomes active, simultaneously inducing a transition B1 from idle to
enabled; (ii) if B1 is compl, then it becomes idle, simultaneously inducing a
transition of B2 from idle to enabled; (iii) if B2 is compl, then it becomes idle,
simultaneously inducing S to move from active to compl. The lifecycle of other
block types can be defined analogously.
2.4 Execution Semantics
We intuitively describe the execution semantics of a DAB M = 〈D,P〉, using
the update/task logic and progression rules of blocks as a basis. Upon execution,
each state ofM is characterized by anM-snapshot, in turn constituted by a data
snapshot of D (cf. Section 2.1), and a control map whose keys are the (active)
case identifiers, and whose values are assignments from each block in P to one
of its lifecycle states.
Initially, the data snapshot fixes the immutable content of the catalog D.cat,
while the repository instance, the case map, and the control map, are all empty.
At each moment in time, theM-snapshot is then evolved by nondeterministically
performing one of the two steps:
(new case creation) A new case is created, obtaining a corresponding fresh
identifier id. The new M-snapshot is then obtained by maintaining the cat-
alog and repository unaltered, while updating: (i) the case map, creating a
new entry with key id and setting all the case variables to undef in such a
newly created entry, with the exception of self , which gets the fresh identi-
fier id; (ii) the control map, creating a new entry with key id and setting all
the block lifecycles to idle in such a newly created entry.
(case progression) The identifier id of a case present in the control/case map
is nondeterministically picked, nondeterministically evolving it of one step
through the process, depending on the current M-snapshot. The new M
-snapshot is then obtained by manipulating, accordingly, the id entries in
the case and control maps, as well as possibly updating the repository if the
selected step involves the application of an effect rule (cf. Section 2.2).
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3 Parameterized Verification of Safety Properties
We now focus on parameterized verification of DABs using SMT-based tech-
niques grounded in the theory of arrays.
3.1 Array-Based Artifact Systems and Safety Checking
We recall the key notions behind array-based systems, and the artifact variants
recently studied in [4,6] to bridge the gap between SMT-based model checking of
array-based systems [16,17] and verification of artifact-centric processes [28,15].
In general terms, an array-based system is described using a multi-sorted theory
that contains two types of sorts, one accounting for the indexes of arrays, and
the other for the elements stored therein. Since the content of an array changes
over time, it is referred to using a function variable, whose interpretation in a
state is that of a total function mapping indexes to elements (so that applying
the function to an index denotes the classical read operation for arrays). The
definition of an array-based system with array state variable a always requires
(i) a formula I(a) describing the initial configuration of the array a; (ii) a formula
τ(a, a′) describing a transition that transforms the content of the array from a to
a′. In such a setting, verifying whether the system can reach unsafe configurations
described by a formula K(a) amounts to check whether the formula I(a0) ∧
τ(a0, a1) ∧ · · · ∧ τ(an−1, an) ∧ K(an) is satisfiable for some n. Notably, several
mature model checkers exist to ascertain safety of these type of systems, such
as mcmt [18] and cubicle [9]. In [4,6], we have extended array-based systems
towards an array-based version of the artifact-centric model, considering two
main settings:
(simple artifact systems - SAS) artifact systems operating over a read-only
relational database that resembles our DAB catalog, and over a single tuple
(or boundedly many tuples) of updatable elements;
(relational artifact systems - RAS) systems that extend SAS with a rela-
tional storage for unboundedly many updatable elements.
Notably, safety properties are checked over such systems irrespectively of the
content of the read-only database, following the tradition of [28,15]. Several
soundness, completeness, and decidability results have been obtained by suitably
controlling the expressiveness of these systems. In addition, from Version 2.8
mcmt has been extended to handle safety checking of SAS and RAS.
3.2 Verification Problems for DABs
First of all, we need a language to express undesired properties over a DAB
M = 〈D,P〉. To do so, we resort to the same guard language introduced in Defi-
nition 6, extended with two features. First, we support querying also the control
map of each case, so as to express control-flow properties. This is done by simply
extending D with additional, special case control variables referring to the lifecy-
cle state of the blocks in P (where each block B gets variable Blifecycle). Each
such variable is assigned, in a given snapshot, to the state of the corresponding
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block lifecycle (i.e., idle, enabled, and the like). We call thes additional case
variables FP . Second, we allow the modeler to inspect the status of multiple
cases at once, so as to check how different cases may implicitly influence each
other via the global repository. This is done by “indexing” guards, with the
assumption that different indexes denote different cases.
Definition 10. Let I be a set of n distinct indexes. A property over n cases of
M = 〈D,P〉 is a formula of the form
∧
i∈I Gi[i], where each Gi is a guard over D
and the case control variables FP satisfying the following condition: every non-
case variable x ∈ normvars(Gi) appearing in Gi must also appear in an atom
whose relation schema belongs to the repository D.repo. ⊳
Example 5. By calling HP the root, process block of Figure 1, we can
test whether some case of the process can terminate through the property
(HPlifecycle = completed)[i]. If the property is unreachable, then no case
can be progressed from the start to the end of the process. Since DAB processes
are block structured, this is enough to ascertain whether the process is unsound.⊳
We study (un)safety of these properties by considering general, unrestricted
DABd, and also two interesting fragments:
(case-bounded) DABs that only introduce a bounded number of cases during
their execution, where the bound is known a-priori - a typical setting being
the one where a single case is studied, in the style of soundness verification
for workflow nets;
(repo-bounded) DABs that introduce only boundedly many tuples in the
repository during their execution, where the bound is known a-priori.
In this light, verification of safety properties over DABs present multiple dimen-
sions of parameterization, depending on the type of DAB under analysis. The
two extremes are: (i) case- and repo-bounded DABs, for which the only parame-
ter is the instantiation of the catalog; (ii) unrestricted DABs, where verification
is carried out parametrically w.r.t. the instantiation of the catalog, the number
of tuples in the repository, and the overall number of cases.
3.3 Translating DABs into Array-Based Artifact Systems
To attack parameterized verification problems over DABs, we translate them
into corresponding verification problems over SAS and RAS. We only provide
here the main intuitions behind the translation, which is fully addressed in the
Appendix. Let M = 〈D,P〉 be a DAB. D.cat is maintained unaltered, as it is
addressed in SAS and RAS in its full generality. The translation of D.cvars and
D.repo depends instead on whether M is studied unrestrictedly, or under case-
and/or repo-boundedness. Consider D.repo. IfM is repo-bounded with a bound
of 1, then every relation schema in D.repo has just one tuple, and consequently
can be represented using a set of (global) variables, one per relation attribute,
in the style of a SAS. A k-bounded setting is handled similarly, just replicating
the variables for k times. If instead no boundedness assumption on the report is
placed, for each relation schema R ∈ D.repo, and each attribute a ∈ R.attrs, a
dedicated array is introduced. The index of the array represents the (implicit)
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identifier of R, in line with our repository model. To reconstruct a specific tuple
from R, one just needs to retrieve the objects present in the arrays corresponding
to the different attributes of R, always using the same index i. The resulting
model corresponds to that of a RAS and its notion of artifact relation [4,6].
A similar strategy is adopted for the case variables: if no bound on the num-
ber of cases is given, then each case variable is translated into a corresponding
array, whose elements maintain the value that one case is assigning to that vari-
able. Accessing all such arrays with the same index produces back the entire
case variable assignments for the corresponding case. Finally, self is handled by
introducing an array with the property that its elements are in bijection with the
indexes (i.e., no element repeats twice in the array). Exactly the same approach
is replicated to store the control information about blocks on a per-case basis.
All in all, depending on the boundedness assumptions on cases and/or repos-
itory, the translation produces a SAS or a RAS with different artifact relations.
Each transition formula realizes one of the progression rules that collectively
realize the execution semantics of the input DAB (cf. Section 2.4).
In [4,6], we focus on parameterized (un)safety of RAS, verifying whether
there exists an instance of the read-only database such that the artifact system
can reach an unsafe configuration. Since the cells of the arrays may point to
identifiers in the catalog, in turn related to other catalog relations via foreign
keys, the standard backward reachability procedure needs to be suitably revised
[6]. In fact, when computing preimage formulae over RAS, existentially quanti-
fied “data” variables may be introduced, breaking the format of state formulae.
To restore the key property that the preimage of a state is again represented
symbolically as a state formula, such additional quantified variables must be
eliminated. Suitable quantifier elimination techniques have been studied in [6,7]
and implemented in the latest version 2.8 of mcmt, which can now natively
handle the verification of RAS. In addition, while the unsafety verification is in
general undecidable for RAS, several subclasses with decidable unsafety have
been singled out. One of such classes corresponds to RAS operating over arrays
whose maximum size is bounded a-priori, i.e. SAS. All in all, the RAS framework
provides a natural foundational and practical basis to formally analyze DABs,
which we tackle next.
From now on, we use BackReach to refer to the backward reachability proce-
dure that:
– takes as input a DAB, a property to be verified, and a series of additional
information related to the boundedness assumptions and the adopted se-
mantics for insertion (set vs multiset);
– translates the input DAB into a corresponding SAS/RAS (according to the
provided additional information), and the input property into a correspond-
ing property over the target SAS/RAS;
– invokes the SAS/RAS backward reachability procedure described in [4,6] and
implemented in mcmt;
– returns yes if and only if the property is reachable.
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All the proofs of the following theorems are obtained by exploiting the trans-
lation, and by showing that the SAS/RAS produced from the translation enjoys
the property stated in the theorem.
3.4 Soundness and Completeness Results
We start by considering case-bounded systems.
Theorem 1. BackReach is sound and complete for case-bounded DABs that use
the multiset or set insertion semantics. ⊳
While for case-bounded DABs soundness and completeness are guaranteed with-
out additional restrictions, this is not the case in the unrestricted setting. The
problem is, in fact, the usage of self , which implicitly allows to create references
across read-write relations (something that is not allowed in a DAB repository,
nor in the corresponding model of RAS). We recover soundness and completeness
by disallowing the explicit usage of self .
Definition 11. A DABM is case-identifier-agnostic if none of the update spec-
ifications in M mentions self . ⊳
Theorem 2. BackReach is sound and complete for case-identifier-agnostic
DABs that use the multiset or set insertion semantics. ⊳
We stress here that soundness and completeness indicate that whenever
BackReach terminates, it produces a correct answer. Termination is not guaran-
teed in the general case (but may very well be obtained on the analyzed DAB),
and consequently BackReach is a semi-decision procedure.
3.5 Termination Results
We now discuss how the previous results can be strengthen to ensure termination
(thus witnessing decidability of parameterized verification). The first, unavoid-
able limitation that we have to impose is on the constraints used in the catalog:
its foreign keys cannot form cycles. This is in line with [20,6]. To define acyclic-
ity, we associate a catalog Cat to a characteristic graph G(Cat) that captures
the dependencies between relation schema components induced by primary and
foreign keys. Specifically, G(Cat) is a directed graph such that:
• for every R ∈ Cat and every attribute a ∈ R.attrs, the pair 〈R, a〉 is a node of
G(Cat) (and nothing else is a node);
• 〈R1, a1〉 → 〈R2, a2〉 is and only if one of the two cases apply: (i) R1 = R2,
a2 6= a1, and a1 = R.id; (ii) a2 = R2 .id and a1 is a foreign key referring R2.
Definition 12. A DAB is acyclic if the characteristic graph of its catalog is so.⊳
Theorem 3. BackReach terminates when verifying properties over case- and
repo-bounded, acyclic DABs using the multiset or set insertion semantics. ⊳
This strong result is obtained due to the fact that case- and repo-bounded DABs
get translated into SAS, where the read-write storage is constituted by a fixed set
of variables. If instead we consider more sophisticated DABs that get translated
into RAS with their sophisticated read-write relational storage, then termination
requires to carefully control the interplay between the different components of
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the DAB. While the required conditions are quite difficult to grasp at the syn-
tactic level, they can be intuitively understood as follows: to ensure termination,
whenever the progression of the DAB depends on the repository, it does so only
via a single entry in one of its relations. This indicates that direct or indirect
comparisons and joins of distinct tuples within the same or different repository
relations cannot be used in an update. Towards avoiding indirect joins, queries
cannot that mix case variables and repository relations, nor update case variables
with the content of other case variables. The following definition is instrumental
to enforce this principle.
Definition 13. A guard G , q(~x) ←
∨n
i=1Qi over a data component D is
separated if, for every i, j we have that normvars(Qi)∩ normvars(Qj) = ∅ and
each Qi is of the form χ∧R(~y)∧ξ (here, χ, R(~y) or ξ are optional), where: (i) χ is
a conjunctive query with filters over D.cat only (that can employ case variables);
(ii) R ∈ D.repo is a repository relation schema; (iii) ~y is a tuple of variables
and/or constant objects in D, such that ~y∩D.cvars = ∅, and normvars(χ)∩~y = ∅;
(iv) ξ is a conjunctive query with filters over D.cat only, that possibly mentions
variables in ~y but does not include any case variable (i.e., casevars(ξ) = ∅), and
such that normvars(χ) ∩ normvars(ξ) = ∅. A property is separated if all its
inner guards are separated. ⊳
Intuitively, a separated guard consists of two isolated parts: one part χ in-
specting the content of case variables and their relationship with the catalog,
and another part R(~y)∧ ξ retrieving a single tuple ~y in some repository relation
R, possibly filtering it through inspection of the catalog via ξ.
Example 6. Consider the refinement EvalApp.pre , GetScore(s :
NumScore) ← ξ ∧ χ of the guard EvalApp.pre from Example 2, where
χ := User(uid, name, age) checks if the variables 〈uid, name, age〉 form a tuple
in User , and ξ := 1 ≤ s ∧ s ≤ 100. This guard is separated since χ and ξ match
the requirements of the previous definition. ⊳
Theorem 4. Let M be a case-bounded, acyclic DAB that uses the multiset in-
sertion semantics, and is so that for each update specification u of M, the fol-
lowing holds:
• If u.eff is an insert&set rule (with an explicit INSERT part), then u.pre is
repo-free;
• If u.eff is a set rule (not containing an INSERT part), then either (i) u.pre
is repo-free, or (ii) u.pre is separated and all case variables D.cvars \ {self}
appear in the SET part of u.eff;
• If u.eff is a delete&set rule, then u.pre is separated and all case variables
D.cvars \ {self} appear in the SET part of u.eff;
• If u.eff is a conditional update rule, then u.pre is repo-free and boolean, so
that u.eff only makes use of the new variables introduced in its UPDATE part
(as well as constant objects in D).
Then, BackReach terminates when verifying separated properties over M. ⊳
Theorem 5. Let M be a case-identifier-agnostic acyclic DAB that uses the
multiset insertion semantics, and is so that for each update specification u in M,
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u satisfies the same conditions as of Theorem 4. Then, BackReach terminates
when verifying separated properties over M. ⊳
It is important to notice that the conditions in Theorems 4 and 5 represent a
concrete, BPMN-like counterpart of the decidability results in [20] and [6].
Example 7. Our hiring job DAB makes use of self towards relating applica-
tions to the identifier of the case to which they were submitted. Hence, if we want
to retain soundness and completeness of BackReach, we have to restrict the anal-
ysis to the case-bounded setting. By considering the data and process schema of
the DAB, we can directly show that it obeys to all conditions in Theorem 1, in
turn guaranteeing termination of BackReach. ⊳
4 First Experiments with MCMT
We have manually encoded the job hiring DAB described in the paper as an
mcmt specification, using the same translation rules recalled in Section 3.3 and
fully spelled out in the Appendix towards proving the main theorems in Sec-
tions 3.4 and 3.5. mcmt checks unsafety of a property through a symbolic,
backward reachability procedure. The algorithm computes iterated preimages of
the given property and applies to them quantifier elimination, until a fixpoint is
reached or until a set intersecting the initial state (i.e., also characterized using a
formula) is found. To do this efficiently, mcmt is equipped with dedicated quan-
tifier elimination techniques, and discharge safety and fixpoint tests encountered
during the backward search to state-of-the-art SMT solvers.
We have checked the encoding of the process against five safe and five un-
safe properties. The first property ascertains whether a job hiring case can ac-
tually reach the end point of the process, in turn witnessing soundness. The
BPM SAFE1 property checks whether it is possible to have a situation where
the Select Winner task is enabled and the case variable result indicates that
the winner is not eligible.
Table 1 shows the so-obtained, very encouraging results. Such initial results
nicely complement those carried out on RAS in [4], indicating that the approach
is promising not just foundationally, but also in terms of tool support. These
experiments, together with the ones reported in this paper, are available as part
of the last distribution 2.8 of mcmt.2 Experiments were performed on a machine
with Ubuntu 16.04, 2.6GHz Intel Core i7 and 16GB RAM.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduce a data-aware version of BPMN, called DAB,
that achieves an interesting trade-off between expressiveness, and the possibil-
ity of applying sophisticated parameterized verification techniques to ascertain
2 http://users.mat.unimi.it/users/ghilardi/mcmt/, subdirectory
/examples/dbdriven of the distribution. The user manual contains a new
section (pages 36–39) on how to encode RASs in MCMT specifications.
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Exp. Res. Time (s) Exp. Res. Time (s)
BPM end process UNSAFE 0.43
BPM SAFE1 SAFE 0.20 BPM UNSAFE1 UNSAFE 0.18
BPM SAFE2 SAFE 5.85 BPM UNSAFE2 UNSAFE 1.17
BPM SAFE3 SAFE 3.56 BPM UNSAFE3 UNSAFE 4.45
BPM SAFE4 SAFE 0.03 BPM UNSAFE4 UNSAFE 1.43
BPM SAFE5 SAFE 0.27 BPM UNSAFE5 UNSAFE 1.14
Table 1. Time spent by mcmt to check different properties over the job hiring
DAB. Names of experiments coincide with those of the mcmt files from the
Ancillary files of arXiv:1905.12991.
safety of the produced models. In particular, we have identified classes of DABs
for which backward reachability techniques coming from the SMT tradition are
correct, further strengthening them to also guarantee termination of backward
reachability. From the foundational point of view, we are interested in equipping
DABs with datatypes and corresponding rigid predicates, including arithmetic
operators, as done in [15] for artifact-centric systems. This is promising espe-
cially considering that there are plenty of state-of-the-art SMT techniques to
handle arithmetics. At the same time, we want to attack the main limitation
of our approach, namely that guards and conditions are actually existential for-
mulae, and the only (restricted) form of universal quantification available in the
update language is that of conditional updates. Universal guards in transition
formulae could be very useful in specifications: for example, they would allow
us to specify a branch in a job hiring process that is followed only if no appli-
cant satisfies a certain condition. This is reminiscent to what happens in the
verification of distributed systems, where universal guards frequently occur in
specifications. The question has been debated since longtime in the literature
and the most effective solution adopted to cope with this problem so far is the
introduction of suitable “monotonic abstractions” (see [1] for a survey). Notably,
this solution is currently implemented in mcmt. Monotonic abstractions could
introduce spurious unsafe traces, and in fact mcmt warns the user about this
(in practice, not so frequent) possibility.
An orthogonal, challenging question is how, and to what extent, some of
the most recent techniques developed for temporal model checking of artifact-
centric systems [15] can be incorporated in our approach, allowing us to prove
more sophisticated properties beyond safety.
From the experimental point of view, while a systematic evaluation is out
of scope of this paper, the initial experiments carried out in this paper and
[4] indicate that the approach is promising. We intend to fully automate the
translation from DABs to array-based systems, and to set up a benchmark to
evaluate the performance of verifiers for data-aware processes, starting from
the examples collected in [20] (which are inspired from BPMN processes, and
consequently should be straightforwardly encoded ad DABs).
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A DAB Blocks
A.1 Basic Blocks
Block Attributes
empty
task A
(1) Atomic/non-atomic
(2) update specification.
catch event e
(1) Type of event e (msg, timer, none)
(2) update specification.
process block es B et
(1) Type of start event es (msg, timer, none)
(2) Update specification of es
(3) Type of end event et (msg, none)
(4) Update specification of et
(5) Arbitrary nested block B
subprocess A
+
(1) Inner process block
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A.2 Flow Blocks
For simplicity, we consider only two nested blocks, but multiple nested blocks
can be seamlessly handled.
Block Attributes
sequence B1 B2 (1) Arbitrary nested blocks B1 and B2
possible
completion X
ϕ1
e
ϕ2
(1) Conditions ϕ1 and ϕ2
(2) Type of end event e (error,msg,none)
deferred
choice
/ parallel
g
B1
B2
g
(1) Gateway type g: X (def. choice), + (paral-
lel)
(2) Arbitrary nested blocks B1 and B2
choice g
B1
B2
g
ϕ1
ϕ2
(1) Gateway type g: X/O (excl./incl. choice)
(2) Conditions ϕ1 and ϕ2
(3) Arbitrary nested blocks B1 and B2
loop X
B1
B2
X
ϕ1
ϕ1
(1) Conditions ϕ1 and ϕ2
(2) Arbitrary nested blocks B1 and B2
event-driven
choice
E1
E2
B1
B2
X
(1) Cath event nested blocks E1 and E2
(2) Arbitrary nested blocks B1 and B2
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A.3 Exception Handling Blocks
For simplicity, we show a single boundary event, but multiple boundary events
and their corresponding handlers can be seamlessly handled.
Block Attributes
backward
exception X A
e
B
(1) Type of boundary event e (er-
ror,msg,timer)
(2) Subprocess nested block A
(3) Arbitrary nested block B
forward
exception A
B1
B2
X
e
(1) Type of boundary event e (er-
ror,msg,timer)
(2) Subprocess nested block A
(3) Arbitrary nested blocks B1 and B2
forward
non-interrupting
exception
A B1
B2
X
e
(1) Type of boundary event e (msg,timer)
(2) Subprocess nested block A
(3) Arbitrary nested blocks B1 and B2
B Preliminaries
In this section we give a review of the preliminaries needed to present RASs.
We adopt the usual first-order syntactic notions of signature, term (denoted
with t1, t2...), atom, (ground) formula, and so on. We use u to represent a tuple
〈u1, . . . , un〉. Our signatures Σ are multi-sorted and include equality for every
sort, which implies that variables are sorted as well. Depending on the context,
we keep the sort of a variable implicit, or we indicate explicitly in a formula that
variable x has sort S by employing notation x : S. The notation t(x), φ(x) means
that the term t, the formula φ has free variables included in the tuple x. We are
concerned only with constants and function symbols f , each of which has sources
S and a target S′, denoted as f : S −→ S′. We assume that terms and formulae
are well-typed, in the sense that the sorts of variables, constants, and function
sources/targets match. A formula is said to be universal (resp., existential) if it
has the form ∀x (φ(x)) (resp., ∃x (φ(x))), where φ is a quantifier-free formula.
Formulae with no free variables are called sentences.
From the semantic side, we use the standard notions of a Σ-structure M and
of truth of a formula in a Σ-structure under an assignment to the free variables.
A Σ-theory T is a set of Σ-sentences; a model of T is a Σ-structure M where
all sentences in T are true. We use the standard notation T |= φ to say that φ
is true in all models of T for every assignment to the free variables of φ. We say
that φ is T -satisfiable iff there is a model M of T and an assignment to the free
variables of φ that make φ true in M.
In the following, we specify transitions of an artifact-centric system using
first-order formulae. To obtain a more compact representation, we make use
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there of definable extensions as a means for introducing so-called case-defined
functions. We fix a signature Σ and a Σ-theory T ; a T -partition is a finite
set κ1(x), . . . , κn(x) of quantifier-free formulae such that T |= ∀x
∨n
i=1 κi(x)
and T |=
∧
i6=j ∀x¬(κi(x) ∧ κj(x)). Given such a T -partition κ1(x), . . . , κn(x)
together with Σ-terms t1(x), . . . , tn(x) (all of the same target sort), a case-
definable extension is the Σ′-theory T ′, where Σ′ = Σ ∪ {F}, with F a “fresh”
function symbol (i.e., F 6∈ Σ)3, and T ′ = T ∪
⋃n
i=1{∀x (κi(x)→ F (x) = ti(x))}.
Intuitively, F represents a case-defined function, which can be reformulated using
nested if-then-else expressions and can be written as F (x) := case of {κ1(x) :
t1; · · · ;κn(x) : tn}. By abuse of notation, we identify T with any of its case-
definable extensions T ′. In fact, it is easy to produce from a Σ′-formula φ′ a
Σ-formula φ equivalent to φ′ in all models of T ′: just remove (in the appropriate
order) every occurrence F (v) of the new symbol F in an atomic formula A, by
replacing A with
∨n
i=1(κi(v) ∧ A(ti(v))). We also exploit λ-abstractions (see,
e.g., formula (2) below) for a more compact (still first-order) representation of
some complex expressions, and always use them in atoms like b = λy.F (y, z) as
abbreviations of ∀y. b(y) = F (y, z) (where, typically, F is a symbol introduced
in a case-defined extension as above).
C Array-based Model
In this section we recall the definitions of the formal setting presented in [4,6] that
is exploited in this paper as target model of our translation. This setting relies
on array-based systems and provides a general framework where introducing
safety verification problems for artifact-centric models called Relational Artifact
Systems (RASs). Those models are verbatim of the ones presented [4,6], but we
prefer presenting them in detail here for safe of self-containedness.
In the following, we formally define RASs. Since they are array-based systems,
we start by recalling the intuition behind them.
In general terms, an array-based system is described using a multi-sorted the-
ory that contains two types of sorts, one accounting for the indexes of arrays, and
the other for the elements stored therein. Since the content of an array changes
over time, it is referred to using a function variable, whose interpretation in a
state is that of a total function mapping indexes to elements (so that applying
the function to an index denotes the classical read operation for arrays). The
definition of an array-based system with array state variable a always requires:
a formula I(a) describing the initial configuration of the array a, and a formula
τ(a, a′) describing a transition that transforms the content of the array from a
to a′. In such a setting, verifying whether the system can reach unsafe config-
urations described by a formula K(a) amounts to check whether the formula
I(a0) ∧ τ(a0, a1) ∧ · · · ∧ τ(an−1, an) ∧K(an) is satisfiable for some n.
Following the tradition of artifact-centric systems [14,10,2,15], an array-based
Relational Artifact Systems (RAS) consists of a read-only DB, a read-write work-
3 Arity and source/target sorts for F can be deduced from the context (considering
that everything is well-typed).
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ing memory for artifacts (which are used in our translation for formalizing the
set of case variables for every process instance and the shared evolving rela-
tions), and a finite set of actions (also called services) that inspect the relational
database and the working memory, and determine the new configuration of the
working memory.
C.1 Read-only DB schemata
We now provide a formal definition of (read-only) DB-schemas by relying on an
algebraic, functional characterization.
Definition 14. A DB schema is a pair 〈Σ, T 〉, where: (i) Σ is a DB signature,
that is, a finite multi-sorted signature whose only symbols are equality, unary
functions, and constants; (ii) T is a DB theory, that is, a set of universal Σ-
sentences. ⊳
Next, we refer to a DB schema simply through its (DB) signatureΣ and (DB)
theory T , and denote by Σ the set of sorts and by Σfun the set of functions in
Σ.
Remark 1. If desired, we can freely extend DB schemas by adding arbitrary n-
ary relation symbols to the signature Σ. For this purpose, we give the following
definition.
Definition 15. A DB extended-schema is a pair 〈Σ, T 〉, where: (i) Σ is a DB
extended-signature, that is, a finite multi-sorted signature whose only symbols
are equality, n-ary relations, unary functions, and constants; (ii) T is a DB
extended-theory, that is, a set of universal Σ-sentences. ⊳
Since for our application we are only interested in relations with primary and
foreign key dependencies (even if our implementation takes into account also the
case of “free” relations, i.e. without key dependencies), we restrict our focus on
DB schemas, which are sufficient to capture those constraints (as explained in the
following subsection). We notice that, in case the assumptions over DB schemas
that discussed below hold for DB extended-theories, all the results presented in
Section D (and Theorem 7) still hold even considering DB extended-schemas
instead of DB schemas. ⊳
We associate to a DB signature Σ a characteristic graph G(Σ) capturing
the dependencies induced by functions over sorts. Specifically, G(Σ) is an edge-
labeled graph whose set of nodes is Σ, and with a labeled edge S
f
−→ S′ for each
f : S −→ S′ in Σfun . We say that Σ is acyclic if G(Σ) is so. The leaves of Σ
are the nodes of G(Σ) without outgoing edges. These terminal sorts are divided
in two subsets, respectively representing unary relations and value sorts. Non-
value sorts (i.e., unary relations and non-leaf sorts) are called id sorts, and are
conceptually used to represent (identifiers of) different kinds of objects. Value
sorts, instead, represent datatypes such as strings, numbers, clock values, etc.
We denote the set of id sorts in Σ by Σids , and that of value sorts by Σval , hence
Σ = Σids ⊎Σval .
We now consider extensional data.
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Definition 16. A DB instance of DB schema 〈Σ, T 〉 is a Σ-structure M that
is a model of T and such that every id sort of Σ is interpreted in M on a finite
set. ⊳
What may appear as not customary in Definition 16 is the fact that value
sorts can be interpreted on infinite sets. This allows us, at once, to reconstruct
the classical notion of DB instance as a finite model (since only finitely many
values can be pointed from id sorts using functions), at the same time supplying
a potentially infinite set of fresh values to be dynamically introduced in the
working memory during the evolution of RASs.
We respectively denote by SM, fM, and cM the interpretation in M of the
sort S (this is a set), of the function symbol f (this is a set-theoretic function),
and of the constant c (this is an element of the interpretation of the corresponding
sort). Obviously, fM and cM must match the sorts in Σ. E.g., if f has source S
and target U , then fM has domain SM and range UM.
We close the formalization of DB schemas by discussing DB theories, whose
role is to encode background axioms. We illustrate a typical background axiom,
required to handle the possible presence of undefined identifiers/values in the
different sorts. This axiom is essential to capture artifact systems whose working
memory is initially undefined, in the style of [15,20]. To specify an undefined
value we add to every sort S of Σ a constant undefS (written from now on, by
abuse of notation, just as undef, used also to indicate a tuple). Then, for each
function symbol f of Σ, we add the following axiom to the DB theory:
∀x (x = undef↔ f(x) = undef) (1)
This axiom states that the application of f to the undefined value produces an
undefined value, and it is the only situation for which f is undefined.
As discussed in [4], the theory T from Definition 14 must satisfy few crucial
model-theoretic requirements for our approach to work: these requirements are
finite model property, decidable constraint satisfiability and the existence of T ∗,
i.e. the model completion of T . Specifically, the backward reachability procedure
requires the availability of suitable quantifier elimination algorithms. However, a
DB theory T does not necessarily have quantifier elimination; nevertheless, it is
often possible to strengthen T in a conservative way (with respect to constraint
satisfiability) and get quantifier elimination. In order to do that, in [4] we consider
the theory T ∗ (when it exists, it is unique), and we show that model completion
turns out to be quite effective to attack the verification of dynamic systems
operating over relational databases. In all this paper we assume that DB theories
T have finite model property, decidable constraint satisfiability and that admit
a model completion T ∗. Specifically, from now on we assume that T consists of
only Axioms (1): in this case, all the assumptions hold.
C.2 Working Memory
In array-based RASs, the working memory consist of function variables. These
variables (usually called arrays) are supposed to model evolving relations, so-
called artifact relations in [15,20]. The idea is to treat artifact relations in a
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uniform way as we did for the read-only DB, where we used function symbols
for representing relations with key dependencies: for the working memory, we
need extra sort symbols (as explaind in the translation section, each sort symbol
corresponds to a database relation symbol) and extra unary function symbols.
variables.
Given a DB schema Σ, an artifact extension of Σ is a signatureΣext obtained
from Σ by adding to it some extra sort symbols4. These new sorts (usually
indicated with letters E,F, . . . ) are called artifact sorts (or artifact relations by
some abuse of terminology), while the old sorts from Σ are called basic sorts.
In array-based BPMN models, artifacts and basic sorts correspond, respectively,
to the index and the elements sorts mentioned in the literature on array-based
systems. Below, given 〈Σ, T 〉 and an artifact extension Σext of Σ, when we
speak of a Σext -model of T , a DB instance of 〈Σext , T 〉, or a Σext -model of T ∗,
we mean a Σext -structure M whose reduct to Σ respectively is a model of T , a
DB instance of 〈Σ, T 〉, or a model of T ∗.
An artifact setting overΣext is a pair (x, a) given by a finite set x of individual
variables and a finite set a of unary function variables: the latter are required to
have an artifact sort as source sort and a basic sort as target sort. Variables in x
are called artifact variables, and variables in a artifact components. Given a DB
instanceM of Σext , an assignment to an artifact setting (x, a) over Σext is a map
α assigning to every artifact variable xi ∈ x of sort Si an element xα ∈ SMi and
to every artifact component aj : Ej −→ Uj (with aj ∈ a) a set-theoretic function
aαj : E
M
j −→ U
M
j . In our array-based RASs, artifact components and artifact
variables correspond, respectively, to arrays and constant arrays (i.e., arrays
with all equal elements) mentioned in the literature on array-based systems.
Intuitevely, an artifact setting represents the “working” memory of an array-
based RAS.
We can view an assignment to an artifact setting (x, a) as a DB instance
extending the DB instance M as follows. Let all the artifact components in
(x, a) having source E be ai1 : E −→ S1, · · · , ain : E −→ Sn. Viewed as a
relation in the artifact assignment (M, α), the artifact relation E “consists”
of the set of tuples {〈e, aαi1 [e], . . . , a
α
in
[e]〉 | e ∈ EM}. Thus each element of E
is formed by an “entry” e ∈ EM (uniquely identifying the tuple, and called
“internal identifier” of the tuple (e, aαi1 [e], . . . , a
α
in
[e])) and by “data” aαi (e) taken
from the read-only databaseM. When the system evolves, the set EM of entries
remains fixed, whereas the components aαi (e) may change: typically, we initially
have aαi (e) = undef, but these values are changed when some defined values are
inserted into the relation modeled by E; the values are then repeatedly modified
(and possibly also reset to undef, if the tuple is removed and e is re-set to point
to undefined values)5.
4 By ‘signature’ we always mean ’signature with equality’, so as soon as new sorts are
added, the corresponding equality predicates are added too.
5 In accordance with mcmt conventions, we denote the application of an artifact com-
ponent a to a term (i.e., constant or variable) v as a[v] (standard notation for arrays),
instead of a(v).
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C.3 RASs
In order to introduce verification problems in the symbolic setting of array-based
systems, one first has to specify which formulae are used to represent
– sets of states,
– the system initializations, and
– system evolution.
To introduce relational dynamic systems we discuss the kind of formulae we use.
In such formulae, we use notations like φ(z, a) to mean that φ is a formula whose
free individual variables are among the z and whose free unary function variables
are among the a. Let (x, a) be an artifact setting over Σext , where x = x1, . . . , xn
are the artifact variables and a = a1, . . . , am are the artifact components (their
source and target sorts are left implicit).
An initial formula is a formula ι(x) of the form6 (
∧n
i=1 xi = ci)∧ (
∧m
j=1 aj =
λy.dj), where ci, dj are constants from Σ (typically, ci and dj are undef).
A state formula has the form ∃e φ(e, x, a), where φ is quantifier-free and the
e are individual variables of artifact sorts.
A transition formula τˆ has the form
∃e (γ(e, x, a) ∧
∧
i x
′
i = Fi(e, x, a) ∧
∧
j a
′
j = λy.Gj(y, e, x, a)) (2)
where the e are individual variables (of both basic and artifact sorts), γ (the
‘guard’) is quantifier-free, x′, a′ are renamed copies of x, a, and the Fi, Gj (the
‘updates’) are case-defined functions.ed
Definition 17. An array-based RAS is
S = 〈Σ, T,Σext , x, a, ι(x, a), τ(x, a, x
′, a′)〉
where: (i) DB := 〈Σ, T 〉 is a (read-only) DB schema, (ii) Σext is an artifact
extension of Σ, (iii) (x, a) is an artifact setting over Σext , (iv) ι is an initial
formula, and (v) τ is a disjunction of transition formulae τˆ . ⊳
D Parameterized Safety via Backward Reachability in
RAS.
All the result presented in this section come from [4], where all the proofs and
the details are provided.
Given a RAS S, we say that a safety formula for S is a state formula υ(x)
describing undesired states of S. As usual in array-based systems, we say that
S is safe with respect to υ if intuitively the system has no finite run leading
from ι to υ. Formally, there is no DB-instance M of 〈Σext , T 〉, no k ≥ 0, and no
assignment in M to the variables x0, a0 . . . , xk, ak such that the formula
ι(x0, a0) ∧ τ(x0, a0, x1, a1) ∧ · · · ∧ τ(xk−1, ak−1, xk, ak) ∧ υ(xk, ak) (3)
is true in M (here xi, ai are renamed copies of x, a). The safety problem for S
is the following: given a safety formula υ decide whether S is safe with respect
to υ.
6 Recall that aj = λy.dj abbreviates ∀y aj(y) = dj .
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Algorithm 1: Backward
reachability algorithm
Function BReach(υ)
1 φ←− υ; B ←− ⊥;
2 while φ∧¬B is T -satisfiable
do
3 if ι ∧ φ is T -satisfiable.
then
return unsafe
4 B ←− φ ∨ B;
5 φ←− Pre(τ, φ);
6 φ←− QE(T ∗, φ);
return (safe, B);
In order to assess safety of Data-
aware BPMN models, we run the back-
ward reachability procedures on RASs, by
exploiting the translation of Data-Aware
BPMN models into the array-based rela-
tional setting presented in the previous
sections.
We shall introduce an algorithm that
semi-decides safety problems for S and
then we shall examine some interesting
cases where the algorithm terminates and
gives a decision procedure. Algorithm 1
describes the backward reachability algorithm for handling the safety problem
for array-based systems S . An integral part of the algorithm is to compute
preimages. For that purpose, for any φ1(x, x
′) and φ2(x), we define Pre(φ1, φ2)
to be the formula ∃x′(φ1(x, x′) ∧ φ2(x′)). The preimage of the set of states de-
scribed by a state formula φ(x) is the set of states described by Pre(τ, φ).
The subprocedure QE(T ∗, φ) in Line 6 applies the quantifier elimination algo-
rithm of T ∗ (the model completion of T ) to the existential formula φ. Algorithm 1
computes iterated preimages of υ and applies to them quantifier elimination, un-
til a fixpoint is reached or until a set intersecting the initial states (i.e., satisfying
ι) is found. Inclusion (Line 2) and disjointness (Line 3) tests produce proof obli-
gations that can be discharged via proof obligations to be handled by SMT
solvers. The fixpoint is reached when the test in Line 2 returns unsat, which
means that the preimage of the set of the current states is included in the set of
states reached by the backward search so far.
We obtain the following Theorem (to understand the statement of the the-
orem, notice that by partial correctness we mean that, when the algorithm ter-
minates, it gives a correct answer and by effectiveness we means that all sub-
procedures in the algorithm can be effectively executed):
Theorem 6. Backward search (cf. Algorithm 1) is effective and partially correct
for solving safety problems for RASs. Specifically, it is sound and complete for
detecting unsafety. ⊳
Theorem 6 shows that backward search is a semi-decision procedure: if the
system is unsafe, backward search always terminates and discovers it; if the sys-
tem is safe, the procedure can diverge (but it is still correct). Notice that the role
of quantifier elimination (Line 6 of Algorithm 1) is twofold: (i) It allows to dis-
charge the fixpoint test of Line 2; (ii) it ensures termination in significant cases,
namely those where (strongly) local formulae, introduced in the next section, are
involved.
An interesting class of RASs is the one where the working memory consists
only of artifact variables (without artifact relations): we call SASs such systems.
For SASs, the following termination result holds:
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Theorem 7. Let 〈Σ, T 〉 be a DB schema with Σ acyclic. Then, for every SAS
S = 〈Σ, T, x, ι, τ〉, backward search terminates and decides safety problems for
S in Pspace in the combined size of x, ι, and τ . ⊳
We remark that acyclicity of Σ is a strong condition and it is not needed
in general, and that Theorem 7 holds also for DB extended-schemas (so, even
adding “free relations” to the DB signatures). In fact, analyzing the proof of
Theorem 7, it is clear that the decidability of the safety problems is guaranteed
when in T there are only finitely many quantifier-free formulae in which x oc-
cur: this happens, for instance, in case T has a purely relational signature or,
more generally, even when T is a generic first-order theory (and not just a DB
(extended)-schema) that is locally finite7.
E Termination with local transitions
We briefly recall the notion of locality and strong locality of transitions as pre-
sented in [4]. All the following notions (and the following theorem) are presented
in [4]).
Consider an acyclic signature Σ, a DB theory T and an artifact setting (x, a)
over an artifact extension Σext of Σ. We call a state formula local if it is a
disjunction of the formulae
∃e1 · · · ∃ek (δ(e1, . . . , ek) ∧
∧k
i=1 φi(ei, x, a)), (4)
and strongly local if it is a disjunction of the formulae
∃e1 · · · ∃ek (δ(e1, . . . , ek) ∧ ψ(x) ∧
∧k
i=1 φi(ei, a)). (5)
In (4) and (5), δ is a conjunction of variable equalities and inequalities, φi, ψ are
quantifier-free, and e1, . . . , ek are individual variables varying over artifact sorts.
The key limitation of local state formulae is that they cannot compare entries
from different tuples of artifact relations: each φi in (4) and (5) can contain only
the existentially quantified variable ei.
A transition formula τˆ is local (resp., strongly local) if whenever a formula φ is
local (resp., strongly local), so is Pre(τˆ , φ) (modulo the axioms of T ∗). Examples
of (strongly) local τˆ are discussed in Appendix F in [4].
Theorem 8. If Σ is acyclic, backward search (cf. Algorithm 1) terminates when
applied to a local safety formula in a RAS whose τ is a disjunction of local
transition formulae. ⊳
F Translation of Data-aware BPMN models into
array-based Systems
In this section, we define the translation of a Data-aware BPMN model into
array-based RASs.
7 We say that T is locally finite iff for every finite tuple of variables x there are only
finitely many non T -equivalent atoms A(x) involving only the variables x.
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F.1 Translation of the Data Schema
Catalogue. We now clarify how the classical, relational database Cat can be
actually translated to the algebraic, functional characterization of symbolic DB
schemata and instances. To technically explain the correspondence, we adopt
the named perspective, where each relation schema is defined by a signature
containing a relation name and a set of typed attribute names.
First of all, take the set S of sorts of a DAB as set of basic sorts for the
translated DB schema that we want to define. Let Cat be a catalogue as defined
in Section 2.1. For every n + 1-ary relation R in Cat, every attribute A of R
is defined over a corresponding basic sort SA in S. Since each relation R(id, ~A)
in Cat must have a unary primary key as its first attribute R.id, we define a
mechanism to correctly reference other attributes ~A in R by means of unary
functions in the DB signature fR,Ai : SR.id → SAi (where i = 1, ..., n and
~A = (A1, ..., An)): SR.id is set as the id sort of R and, in the corresponding DB
instanceM, fMR,Ai maps, for every tuple x in R
M, its identifier element (i.e., the
first component of x) to the unique element in the tuple corresponding to the
attribute Ai. If Ai is an id sort of some other relation R
′, fR,Ai represents the
foreign key referencing to R′.
Conversely, starting from a symbolic DB schema, we see how Definition 14
naturally corresponds to the definition of relational database schema equipped
with single-attribute primary keys and foreign keys
Let 〈Σ, T 〉 be a DB schema. Each id sort S ∈ Σids corresponds to a dedicated
relation RS with the following attributes: (i) one identifier attribute idS with
type S; (ii) one dedicated attribute af with type S
′ for every function symbol
f ∈ Σfun of the form f : S −→ S′.
The fact that RS is built starting from functions in Σ naturally induces dif-
ferent database dependencies in RS . In particular, for each non-id attribute af
of RS , we get a functional dependency from idS to af ; altogether, such depen-
dencies in turn witness that idS is the (primary) key of RS . In addition, for each
non-id attribute af of RS whose corresponding function symbol f has id sort
S′ as image, we get an inclusion dependency from af to the id attribute idS′ of
RS′ ; this captures that af is a foreign key referencing RS′ .
Given a DB instance M of 〈Σ, T 〉, its corresponding relational in-
stance I is the minimal set satisfying the following property: for every
id sort S ∈ Σids , let f1, . . . , fn be all functions in Σ with domain S;
then, for every identifier o ∈ SM, I contains a labeled fact of the form
RS(idS : o
M, af1 : f
M
1 (o
M), . . . , afn : f
M
n (o
M)). With this interpretation, the ac-
tive domain of I is the set⋃
S∈Σids
(SM\{undefM})∪
{
v ∈
⋃
V ∈Σval
VM
∣∣∣∣ v 6= undefM and there exist f ∈ Σfunand o ∈ dom(fM) s.t. fM(o) = v
}
consisting of all (proper) identifiers assigned by M to id sorts, as well as all
values obtained in M via the application of some function. Since such values
are necessarily finitely many, one may wonder why in Definition 16 we allow for
interpreting value sorts over infinite sets. The reason is that, in our framework, an
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evolving artifact system may use such infinite provision to inject and manipulate
new values into the working memory. From the definition of active domain above,
exploiting Axioms (1) we get that the membership of a tuple (x0, . . . , xn) to a
generic n+1-ary relation RS with key dependencies (corresponding to an id sort
S) can be expressed in our setting by using just unary function symbols and
equality:
RS(x0, . . . , xn) iff x0 6= undef∧ x1 = f1(x0) ∧ · · · ∧ xn = fn(x0) (6)
Hence, the representation of negated atoms is the one that directly follows
from negating (6):
¬RS(x0, . . . , xn) iff x0 = undef∨ x1 6= f1(x0) ∨ · · · ∨ xn 6= fn(x0) (7)
Formula (6) exactly summarizes and explicitly shows the equivalence between
symbolic DB schemata and relational Catalogues. Thus, in the following we will
make use of relational Catalogues or DB schemata interchangeably.
This relational interpretation of DB schemas exactly reconstructs the re-
quirements posed by [15,20] on the schema of the read-only database: (i) each
relation schema has a single-attribute primary key; (ii) attributes are typed;
(iii) attributes may be foreign keys referencing other relation schemas; (iv) the
primary keys of different relation schemas are pairwise disjoint.
We stress that all such requirements are natively captured in our functional
definition of a DB signature, and do not need to be formulated as axioms in the
DB theory. The DB theory is used to express additional constraints, like that
in Axioms (1) Notice that, in order to translate Data-aware BPMN models into
the array-based setting, we just need to consider the DB theory with Axioms (1)
only: this is because the empty DB theory itself is able to capture the require-
ments of Section 2.1, and Axioms (1) are needed to handle the undefined values
in a correct way, that is every function symbol f maps the undefined value of
one sort to the undefined value of another one, and it is the only case when f is
undefined.
Repository and Case Variables. In the following, we denote an artifact
assignment and a DB instance by using α and M respectively.
Consider the set of process instances PI of a data-aware BPMN model. We
associate to PI a fresh sort symbol PIindex. We call an artifact component with
source PIindex“case variables artifact component” and we say that all the case
variables artifact components form “the case variables artifact relation”. Intu-
itively, every tuple with first component i ∈ PIindex of this artifact relation
is used to formalize the values of the case variables for the specific process in-
stance represented by the element i that is the internal identifier of the tuple.
We associate to every case variable v ∈ VC with sort S an artifact component
av with PIindex as its source sort and S as its target sort. Intuitively, we are
associating to every case variable an array whose locations are indexed by the
process instances from PIindex and whose components contain a value from the
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interpretation of the sort S in Cat. For every process instance i ∈ PIMindex, the
tuple (i, aαv1 [i], . . . , a
α
vn
[i]) denotes the set of case variables for the process in-
stance i. All the “the case variables artifact relation” are usually initialized with
undefined values.
Then, we associate to every relationR := 〈R1, ..., Rm〉 in Repo an artifact sort
symbol Rindex different from PIindex and m artifact components aR1 , ..., aRm
with Rindex as their common source and respectively the sorts of R1,...Rm as
their target: sometimes, we denote the tuple (aR1 , ..., aRm) by writing aR. Intu-
itively, given a tuple (zM1 , ..., z
M
m ) ∈ R
M, we associate to it an element e ∈ RMindex
and the tuple (e, aαR1 [e], . . . , a
α
Rm
[e]), where aαR1 [e] = z
M
1 , . . . , a
α
Rm
[e] = zMm : the
element e is the “internal identifier” of that tuple in RM. Artifact relations that
have a sort E different from PIindex as their artifact sort are called “shared
(or repository) artifact relations”. All the “shared artifact relations” are usually
initialized with undefined values.
F.2 Translation of Update Logic and Process Schema
We inductively translate into the array-based setting the blocks from our
data-aware BPMN models that are used to construct workflows. We associate
to the lifecycle status of every block B a case variable artifact component
“lifecycleStateB” with PIindex as their artifact sort. These function variables
constitute the control variables of the translated workflows. For every DAB S,
we define B := {lifecycleB‖B ∈ Blocks}, where Blocks is the set of all the
blocks that form the Process Component of S.
The first block that should be translated is the block Task. Since it involves
preconditions and update, we preliminarily discuss how to translate them into
the array-based setting.
Given a guard q(~x) ← Q over D as defined in Section 2.1, for the purpose
of our translation we can assume that Q, instead of a disjunction of conjunctive
queries with filters, only consists of a conjunction of atoms or negated atoms
(i.e., cubes), where every atom is like in Section 2.1. In fact, we can first put Q
in disjunctive normal form: so, Q is equivalent to a disjunction of cubes. Then, it
can be easily seen that, since existential quantifiers commute with disjunctions,
it is always possibile to preprocess a precondition of a task that is a disjunction
of cubes so as to split that task into new tasks with preconditions that are cubes
(every disjunct is the precondition of one of the new tasks). The resulting DAB
is equivalent to the original one.
We say that an extended guard is a cube Q whose variables v from D.cvars∪B
are substituted with terms v[I], where v are function variables that keep the same
name of v and I is a process instance in PI. Analogously, we define extended
update for a task a formula of type “update” as defined in Definition 2.2 whose
variables v from D.cvars∪B are substituted with terms v[I], where v are function
variables that keep the same name of v and I is a process instance in PI. In
general, given a formulae φ, we call φext(I) the formula obtained from φ by
substituting every variable v from D.cvars ∪ B in φ with v[I], where I ∈ PI.
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Given an extended formulae, the translation of the query language works as
follows: a variable v ∈ D.cvars ∪ B is associated to a case variable artifact com-
ponent v (that keeps the same name) in the array-based setting, and every term
v[I] (with I ∈ PI) of v is associated to the corresponding function application
(read-operation) v[i] (with i ∈ PIindex) in the array-based setting.
We give the formal translation of the semantics of data-aware BPMN models
by introducing rule-based transitions that fit the format of transition formulae
in array-based RASs. In fact, for the purpose of this paper, we can simplify the
form of transition formulae from RASs by focusing on rule-based formulae of the
following form:
rule Trans i t i on =
i f Guard
then Update
when “Guard” is an extended guard and “Update” is an extended update for
a task.
Formally, it can be easily seen that the previous rule-based formulae can
be translated into transition formulae of RASs as follows. First of all, given an
extended guard G and an extended update U , we rewrite G and U into the
array-based setting as follows (when we say “add to G (or to U) the sub-formula
φ”, it means that we conjunct the sub-formula φ with G (or U)):
1. If U is the constructor INSERT ~u INTO R AND SET ~x = ~v for R ∈ Repo, and
the required semantics is the set-theoretic one, substitute it in U with the
sub-formula:
a′R := ∀j( if j = eins then ~u else (if aR[j] = ~u then undef else aR[j]))∧~x
′ := ~v
where aR := (aR1 , ..., aRn) are the artifact components of the shared arti-
fact relation Rindex and eins is in Rindex, and add to G the sub-formula
(aR1 [eins] = undef ∧ ... ∧ aRn [eins] = undef);
2. If U is the constructor INSERT ~u INTO R AND SET ~x = ~v for R ∈ Repo,
and the required semantics is the multiset-theoretic one, substitute it in U
with the sub-formula a′R[eins] := ~u ∧ ~x
′ := ~v, where aR := (aR1 , ..., aRn) are
the artifact components of the shared artifact relation Rindex and eins is in
Rindex, and add to G the sub-formula (aR1 [eins] = undef∧ ... ∧ aRn [eins] =
undef);
3. If U is the constructor DEL ~u FROM R AND SET ~x = ~v for R ∈ Repo, substitute
it in U with the sub-formula a′R[edel] := undef ∧ ~x
′ := ~v, where aR :=
(aR1 , ..., aRn) are artifact components of the shared artifact relation Rindex
and edel is in Rindex, and add to G the subformula aR[edel] = ~u.
4. If U is the constructor UPDATER(~v) IFψ(~u,~v) THENR(~u′) ELSER(~u′′) for R ∈
Rep, substitute it in U with a′R := ∀j( if ψ(~u, aR[j]) then ~u1 else ~u2), where
aR = (aR1 , ..., aRn) are artifact components of the shared artifact relation
Rindex, j is in Rindex and u1, u2 are u
′, u′′ where every occurrence of variable
vk from ~v has been substitute with aRk [j].
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5. We substitute every term of the kind v[I] in G or in U , where v ∈ D.cvars,
with the term av[i], where av is the case variables artifact component asso-
ciated to v and i ∈ PIindex;
6. We substitute every atom R(t1, ..., tn) in G, where R ∈ Repo, with the sub-
formula (aR1 [e] = t1 ∧ ... ∧ aRn [e] = tn), where aR1 , ..., aRn are artifact
components of the shared artifact relation Rindex and e ∈ Rindex is a fresh
variable.
7. We substitute every atom R(t0, ..., tn) in G and U , where R ∈ Cat, with
the sub-formula (t0 6= undef ∧ t1 = f1(t0) ∧ · · · ∧ tn = fn(t0)), where each
fk (k = 1, ..., n) is the unary function fR,Ak associated to R and its k-th
attribute Ak (here, we employ Formula (6)).
In Step (4) above, we translated only the flat “if-then-else” constructor, since
the “nested” one has an analogous translation: in fact, after the keywords “then”
or “else”, instead of a term there will be the iterated translation of the same
“if-then-else” constructor.
After this rewriting phase of G and U , we obtain the following formula:
∃eins ∃edel ∃e ∃i ∃y
(
G(v1[i], ..., vm[i], y1, eins, edel, e)
∧U(v1[i], ..., vm[i], y, eins, edel, e)
)
(8)
where eins, edel, e contains all the variables of artifact sorts that have been
called eins, edel, e respectively during the rewriting phase, vk are case variables
artifact components associated to case variables in D.cvars and i is the only
variable of artifact sort PIindex introduced during the rewriting phase: notice
that i is different from all the eins, edel, e variables. Notice that we add the
existential quantifier ∃i in front of the transition formula and, if some variable
y ∈ V \ VC occurs free in G or in U , we also add (avoiding redundancies) the
existential quantifiers ∃y in front of the transition formula. Then, we eliminate
the quantifiers of the form ∃y that bind variables of type y that allow at least
one definition like y := aR[e].
Formula (8) fits the format of Formula (2). Thus, from now on it is sufficient
to show that, in a rule-based transition, the formulae corresponding to “Guard”
and “Update” are respectively an extended guard and an extended update. As
already noticed, it is straightforward to see that preconditions and updates as
presented in Section 2.1 can be transformed into extended guards and extended
updates respectively.
Every block B has the control variable lifecycleStateB[i] for every process
instance i that can take at least three distinct values: “idle”, “enabled”, “com-
pleted”. Blocks that have a boundary event can also have lifecycleStateB[i] :=
“error′′. We now provide the formal translation of every blocks, by exploiting
rule-base transitions.8
8 In the following, the constant “error” refers to finitely many different labels of type
error, and each of them is linked to an exception handler: hence, every error handler
is labeled using its unique error label and every constant “error” refers uniquely to
it.
36
Base case: an atomic task T . In case of an atomic task, the vari-
able lifecycleStateT [i] (for every process instance i) takes three distinct values:
“idle”, “enabled”, “completed”. An atomic task T is made up of two transitions:
– when T is ”enabled” for a process instance i, preconditions over data are
evaluated and, in case they are true, T can non-deterministically update the
working memory (data + control variables) and become ”completed” for i.
We can express formally the lifecycle of an atomic task T as follows:
rule T1 =
i f lifecycleStateT [I] = enabled
PRECONDITION ON DATA
then lifecycleStateT ′[I] = completed
UPDATES OVER THE WORKING MEMORY
Since “PRECONDITIONON DATA” and “UPDATES OVER THEWORK-
ING MEMORY” are the corresponding extended versions of a guard and an up-
date of a data-aware BPMN model respectively, and since they are conjuncted
with formulae of the kind lifecycleStateT [I] = constant , the previous transi-
tions fit the format of (8).
In the following paragraphs, it can be easily seen that all the transitions fit
the format of (8): specifically, the formulae φ, φ1, φ2 that appear in some Guards,
are conditions in the sense of Section 2.1 , hence the claim is true: all the other
cases are straightforward.
Remark 2. A task T could be also formalized in a non-atomic way: in this case,
the variable lifecycleStateT [i] for every process instance i takes four distinct
values: “idle”, “enabled”, “active”, “completed”. An atomic task T is made up
of two transitions:
– when T is ”enabled” for a process instance i, preconditions over data are
evaluated and, in case they are true, T can non deterministically become
“active” for i;
– when T is “active” for a process instance i, T becomes ”completed” for i
and the updates over the working memory (data + control variables) are
performed. ⊳
Formally, we have:
rule T1 =
i f lifecycleStateT [I] = enabled
PRECONDITION
then lifecycleStateT ′[I] = active
rule T2 =
i f lifecycleStateT [I] = active
then lifecycleStateT ′[I] = completed
UPDATES OVER THE WORKING MEMORY
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Base case: an event E. For every event E, the variable lifecycleStateT [i]
for every process instance i takes three distinct values: “idle”, “enabled”, “com-
pleted”. An event E is made up of one transition: when T is ”enabled” for a
process instance i, T can non-deterministically become ”completed” for i and
the updates over the working memory (data + control variables) are performed.
We can express formally the lifecycle of an event E as follows:
rule T1 =
i f lifecycleStateE[I] = enabled
then lifecycleStateE′[I] = completed
UPDATES OVER THE WORKING MEMORY
By using an argument similar to the previous one, we conclude that the
transitions translating the behavior of an event E fit the format of (8).
In the following, we give the translation of the DABs blocks. Whenever a
block B has some sub-components Bi (that are still blocks), we assume that
they are defined by inductive hypothesis. For blocks, we use the label “waiting”
for denoting that it is “active”.
SEQF: sequence flow.
rule T1 =
i f lifecycleStateB[I] = enabled
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = enabled
lifecycleStateB′[I] = waiting
rule T2 =
i f lifecycleStateB1[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′2[I] = enabled
rule T3 =
i f lifecycleStateB2[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateB′2[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′[I] = completed
PAR: parallel block B.
rule T1 =
i f lifecycleStateB[I] = enabled
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = enabled
lifecycleStateB′2[I] = enabled
lifecycleStateB′[I] = waiting
rule T2 =
i f lifecycleStateB1[I] = completed
lifecycleStateB2[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = idle
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lifecycleStateB′2[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′[I] = completed
OR: conditional inclusive block B.
rule T1 =
i f lifecycleStateB[I] = enabled
φ1 ∧ (¬φ2)
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = enabled
lifecycleStateB′[I] = waiting1
rule T2 =
i f lifecycleStateB[I] = enabled
φ2 ∧ (¬φ1)
then lifecycleStateB′2[I] = enabled
lifecycleStateB′[I] = waiting1
rule T3 =
i f lifecycleStateB[I] = enabled
φ1 ∧ φ2
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = enabled
lifecycleStateB′2[I] = enabled
lifecycleStateB′[I] = waiting2
rule T4 =
i f lifecycleStateB1[I] = completed
lifecycleStateB[I] = waiting1
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′[I] = completed
rule T5 =
i f lifecycleStateB[I] = waiting1
lifecycleStateB2[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateB′2[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′[I] = completed
rule T6 =
i f lifecycleStateB1[I] = completed
lifecycleStateB2[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′2[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′[I] = completed
CHOICE: conditional exclusive block with choice B.
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rule T1 =
i f lifecycleStateB[I] = enabled
φ
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = enabled
lifecycleStateB′[I] = waiting
rule T2 =
i f lifecycleStateB[I] = enabled
¬φ
then lifecycleStateB′2[I] = enabled
lifecycleStateB′[I] = waiting
rule T3 =
i f lifecycleStateB1[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′[I] = completed
rule T4 =
i f lifecycleStateB2[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateB′2[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′[I] = completed
DEF-CHOICE: conditional exclusive block with deferred choice B.
rule T1 =
i f lifecycleStateB[I] = enabled
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = enabled
lifecycleStateB′[I] = waiting
rule T2 =
i f lifecycleStateB[I] = enabled
then lifecycleStateB′2[I] = enabled
lifecycleStateB′[I] = waiting
rule T3 =
i f lifecycleStateB1[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′[I] = completed
rule T4 =
i f lifecycleStateB2[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateB′2[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′[I] = completed
LOOP: a loop block B.
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rule T1 =
i f lifecycleStateB[I] = enabled
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = enabled
lifecycleStateB′[I] = waiting
rule T2 =
i f lifecycleStateB1[I] = completed ∧ φ
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′2[I] = enabled
rule T3 =
i f lifecycleStateB2[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = enabled
lifecycleStateB′2[I] = idle
rule T4 =
i f lifecycleStateB1[I] = completed ∧ (¬φ)
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′[I] = completed
PROC: a process block B.
rule T1 =
i f lifecycleStateB[I] = enabled
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = enabled
lifecycleStateB′[I] = waiting
rule T2 =
i f lifecycleStateB1[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′[I] = completed
BLOCK-ERR: a block with error B.
rule T1 =
i f lifecycleStateB[I] = enabled
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = enabled
lifecycleStateB′[I] = waiting
rule T2 =
i f lifecycleStateB1[I] = completed ∧ φ
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′[I] = completed
rule T3 =
i f lifecycleStateB1[I] = completed ∧ (¬φ)
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then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = idle
lifecycleStateH ′[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′bound-hand[I] = error
where the Hs are all the sub-blocks of the block Bbound-hand whose boundary
is directly connected to the handler block for “error”.
Alternatively, T3 could also be
rule T3,alt =
i f lifecycleStateB1[I] = completed ∧ (¬φ)
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = idle
lifecycleStateH ′[I] = idle
errorB′bound-hand[I] = true
where errorBbound-hand is a boolean variable linked to Bbound-hand.
BACK-EXCP: a backward exception handling block B.
Here, A is a subprocess.
rule T1 =
i f lifecycleStateB[I] = enabled
then lifecycleStateA′[I] = enabled
lifecycleStateB′[I] = waiting
rule T2 =
i f lifecycleStateA[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateA′[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′[I] = completed
rule T3 =
i f lifecycleStateA[I] = error
then lifecycleStateA′[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′1[I] = enabled
rule Terr1 =
i f lifecycleStateA[I] = enabled
then lifecycleStateA′[I] = error
lifecycleStateH ′[I] = idle
rule Terr2 =
i f lifecycleStateA[I] = waiting
then lifecycleStateA′[I] = error
lifecycleStateH ′[I] = idle
rule Terr3 =
i f lifecycleStateA[I] = active
then lifecycleStateA′[I] = error
lifecycleStateH ′[I] = idle
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where the Hs are all the sub-blocks of the block A.
FOR-EXCP: a forward exception handling block B.
Here, A is a subprocess.
rule T1 =
i f lifecycleStateB[I] = enabled
then lifecycleStateA′[I] = enabled
lifecycleStateB′[I] = waiting
rule T2 =
i f lifecycleStateA[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateA′[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′1[I] = enabled
rule T3 =
i f lifecycleStateB1[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′[I] = completed
rule T4 =
i f lifecycleStateA[I] = error
then lifecycleStateA′[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′2[I] = enabled
rule T5 =
i f lifecycleStateB2[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateB′2[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′[I] = completed
rule Terr1 =
i f lifecycleStateA[I] = enabled
then lifecycleStateA′[I] = error
lifecycleStateH ′[I] = idle
rule Terr2 =
i f lifecycleStateA[I] = waiting
then lifecycleStateA′[I] = error
lifecycleStateH ′[I] = idle
rule Terr3 =
i f lifecycleStateA[I] = active
then lifecycleStateA′[I] = error
lifecycleStateH ′[I] = idle
where the Hs are all the sub-blocks of the block A.
NON-INTERR: a non-interrupting exception handling block B.
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Here, we also need a boolean variable errorA that changes its value when
the error occurs. A is a subprocess.
rule T1 =
i f lifecycleStateB[I] = enabled
then lifecycleStateA′[I] = enabled
lifecycleStateB′[I] = waiting
rule T2 =
i f lifecycleStateA[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateA′[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′1[I] = enabled
rule T3 =
i f lifecycleStateB1[I] = completed
errorA = false
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′[I] = completed
rule T4 =
i f errorA = true
then lifecycleStateB′2[I] = enabled
errorA′ = true
rule T5 =
i f lifecycleStateB1[I] = completed
lifecycleStateB2[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′2[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′[I] = completed
rule Terr1 =
i f lifecycleStateA[I] = enabled
then lifecycleStateA′[I] = error
lifecycleStateH ′[I] = idle
rule Terr2 =
i f lifecycleStateA[I] = waiting
then lifecycleStateA′[I] = error
lifecycleStateH ′[I] = idle
rule Terr3 =
i f lifecycleStateA[I] = active
then lifecycleStateA′[I] = error
lifecycleStateH ′[I] = idle
where the Hs are all the sub-blocks of the block A.
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F.3 Alternative translation of specific blocks
For sake of simplicity (and in order to make the translation more efficient in per-
formance), sometimes we can freely employ the following alternative translation
for specific blocks that are useful in practice.
n-SEQ: n-iterated sequence flow block B.
In case a sequence flow block B is formed of n > 2 sub-blocks Bk, we can
make use of the following rule-based transitions:
rule T1 =
i f lifecycleStateB[I] = enabled
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = enabled
lifecycleStateB′[I] = waiting
rule T2 =
i f lifecycleStateB1[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′2[I] = enabled
rule T3 =
i f lifecycleStateBk[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateBk[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′k+1[I] = enabled
where 2 ≤ k < n
rule T4 =
i f lifecycleStateBn[I] = completed
then lifecycleStateB′n[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′[I] = completed
ERR&EVENT: “either error or event” block.
In case of a event-based fork block, where the first branch has an event B1
and the second one is an error event B2, we have the following translation:
rule T1 =
i f lifecycleStateB1[I] = enabled
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = completed
UPDATES OVER THE WORKING MEMORY
rule T2 =
i f lifecycleStateB1[I] = enabled
then lifecycleStateB′1[I] = idle
lifecycleStateH ′[I] = idle
lifecycleStateB′bound-hand[I] = error
UPDATES OVER THE WORKIN MEMORY PERFORMED BY B2
where the Hs are all the sub-blocks of the block Bbound-hand whose boundary
is directly connected to the handler block for “error”.
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F.4 Translation of Reachability Queries
The translation of a reachability query is totally analogous to the translation
presented in Subsection F.2 for guards and updates, with the proviso that case
variables associated to different process instances must be translated into case
variables artifact component applied to different indexes from PIindex. More
formally, given a reachability query Q :=
∧
i∈I Gi[i], where Gi :=
∨
kGk is a
guard, we associate to every i ∈ I and index ei ∈ PIindex, we substitute every
case variable v in Gi[i] with the term v[i] (read-operation of a function variable
x) and we apply the same rewriting policy of Subsection F.2 to every its conjunct
Gk: thus, we obtain a quantifier-free formula of the kind:
∃e φ(e, x, a)
, where φ is quantifier-free and the e are individual variables of artifact sorts
(where each e is either in PIindex or in some “repository” artifact relation), i.e.
we get a state formula of RASs, as required.
G Soundness and Completeness Results
In this section we sketch the proof of the soundness and completeness results.
Remark 3. Notice that, in our translation to array-based systems, case vari-
ables of case-bounded DABs can be treated as proper artifact variables of RASs,
instead of arrays. This is trivial since we do not need (undounded) indexes (taken
from some artifact sort) in case of 1-case DABs, and, analogously, in case of k-
bounded DABs, it is sufficient to associate every case variable to k corresponding
artifact variables. ⊳
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 clearly follow from Theorem 6 and from the
translation into RASs described in the previous section.
H Termination Results
Notice that clearly Cat is acyclic iff its corresponding DB schema in RASs is
acyclic. Hence, a DAB is acyclic iff its translated RAS has an acyclic DB schema.
Thanks to Remark 3, Theorem 3 simply follows from Theorem 7 and from
our translation in RASs.
It can be easily seen, by exploiting our translation into RASs, that the con-
ditions posed over updates in Theorem 4 and Theorem 5 exactly correspond to
suitable requirements over the translated updates in RASs that guarantee strong
locality. Hence, it is possible to apply Theorem 8 in order to get termination: in
fact, it is clear that the translation of a separated reachability query is a strongly
local formula.
We devote the following subsection to sketch the proof of strong locality of
the transitions translating the restricted updates of Theorem 4.
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H.1 Translated Updates that are strongly local
We give a sketch of the proof of strong locality of transitions that are the trans-
lations into the array-based setting of “Insert&set rule” and ”Delete&set rule”
with the restriction of Section 3.5: the other updates presented in Section 3.5
can be proved in a similar way to have a strongly local translation. All the
proofs sketched in this section concerning the fact that the format of those
transitions fits the definition of strong locality are similar to the ones in Ap-
pendix F of [4], where all the details are deeply analyzed and all the restricted
updates corresponding to the ones presented in Section 3.5 are proved to be
strongly local transitions. Specifically, by adopting the conventions of [4], we
notice that the proofs of strong locality of the translations of “Insert&set rule”,
“Set rule”, “Delete&set rule” and “Conditional update rule” correspond and are
analogous (with trivial adaptations) to the proofs of strong locality (provided
in Appendix F in [4]) of “Insertion Updates”, ‘Propagation Updates”, “Deletion
Updates” and “Bulk Updates”. In the following, when we say that a translated
array-based formula is “repository-free”, “over the Catalogue” or etc., we mean,
by abuse of notation, that this formula is the translation of a corresponding
“repository-free”, “over the Catalogue” or etc. query of a DAB.
Delete&set rule. We want to remove a tuple t := (t1, ..., tm) from an
m-ary relation R of the Repository and assign the values t1, ..., tm to some of
the case variables (let x := x1, x2, where x1 := (xi1 , ..., xim) are the variables
where we want to transfer the tuple t). This operation has to be applied only
if the current case variables x satisfy the repository-free pre-condition π(x1, x2)
and additional variables y := y
1
, y
2
(where the y
1
are elements from the tuple
t) satisfy the post-condition ψ(y
1
, y
2
) over the Catalogue. The variables x2 are
not propagated, i.e. they are reassigned (possibly with the same values that they
have before). Let r := r1, ..., rm be the artifact components of R in the translated
array-based setting. Such an update can be formalized in the translated array-
based formalism as follows:
∃y
1
∃y
2
∃i ∃e ∃i

π(x1[i], x2[i]) ∧ r[e] = y1 ∧ ψ(y1, y2) ∧ r1[e] 6= undef∧ ...∧ rn[e] 6= undef∧ (x′1[i] := r[e] ∧ x′2[i] := y2 ∧ s′ := s ∧
∧ r′ := λj.(if j = e then undef else r[j]))


(9)
where s are the artifact components of the relations from the Repository dif-
ferent from R, and π and ψ are free-repository conjunctive queries. Notice that
the y
1
, y
2
are non deterministically produced values for the updated x′2. In the
terminology of [20], notice that no case variable variable is “propagated” in a
deletion update.
We sketch the proof of the fact that the preimage along (9) of a strongly
local formula is strongly local. Consider a strongly local formula
K := ψ′(x[i]) ∧ ∃e

Diff(e) ∧ ∧
er∈e
φer (r[er]) ∧Θ


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where Θ is a formula involving the artifact components s (which are not updated)
such that no er occurs in it.
Computing the preimage Pre(9,K), we get (with a computation analogous
to the one done in Appendix F in [4]) the disjunction of the formulae:
– ∃e, e
(
Diff(e, e) ∧ π(x1[i], x2[i]) ∧ θ(r[e]) ∧
∧
er∈e
φer (r[er]) ∧ Θ
)
– ∃d ∃e
(
Diff(e) ∧ π(x1[i], x2[i]) ∧ θ(r[ej ]) ∧
∧
∧
er∈e,er 6=ej
φer (r[er]) ∧ φej (undef) ∧ Θ
)
which is strongly local, where θ is a quantifier-free Σ-formula (Σ is the DB
signature of the read-only DB that is translation of the Catalogue).
Insert&set rule. We want to insert a tuple of values t := (t1, ..., tm) from
the case variables x1 := (xi1 , ..., xim) (let x := x1, x2 as above) into an m-ary
relation R of the Repository. This operation has to be applied only if the current
case variables x and additional variables y := y
1
, y
2
satisfy the repository-free
pre-condition π(x1, x2, y). Let r := r1, ..., rm be the artifact components of R.
Such an update can be formalized in the translated array-based formalism as
follows:
∃d1, d2 ∃e

 π(x1[i], x2[i], y) ∧ r[e] = undef∧ (x′[i] := y ∧ s′ := s ∧
∧ r′ := λj.(if j = e then x1[i] else r[j]))

 (10)
where s are the artifact components of the relations from the Repository different
from R. Notice that y are used to produce values for the updated case variables
x′. In the terminology of [20], notice that no artifact variable is propagated
in a insertion update. Notice that it is allowed that some case variables are
propagated (i.e., that some, or all, x′k := xk)
Notice also that the following arguments remain the same even if r[e] = undef
is replaced with a conjunction of some literals of the form rj [e] = undef, for some
j = 1, ...,m, or even if r[e] = undef is replaced with a generic constraint χ(r[e]).
We sketch the proof of the fact that the preimage along (10) of a strongly
local formula is strongly local. Consider a strongly local formula
K := ψ′(x[i]) ∧ ∃e

Diff(e) ∧ ∧
er∈e
φer (r[er]) ∧Θ


where Θ is a formula involving the translation of the relations s (which are not
updated) from the Repository such that no er occurs in it.
Computing the preimage Pre(10,K), we get (with a computation analogous
to the one done in Appendix F in [4]) the disjunction of the formulae:
– ∃e, e
(
Diff(e, e) ∧ θ(x1[i], x2[i]) ∧ r[e] = undef ∧
∧
er∈e
φer (r[er]) ∧ Θ
)
– ∃e
(
Diff(e) ∧ θ(x1[i], x2[i]) ∧ φej (x1[i]) ∧ r[e] = undef∧
∧
er∈e,er 6=ej
φer (r[er]) ∧ Θ
)
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Fig. 2. Job hiring process
which is a strongly local formula, where θ is a quantifier-free Σ-formula (Σ is
the DB signature of the read-only DB that is translation of the Catalogue).
We remark that, in a “Insert&set” update, the insertion of the same content
in correspondence to different entries is allowed. If we want to avoid this kind of
multiple insertions, the update r′ must be modified as follows:
r′ := λj.
(
if j = e then x1 else
(if r[j] = x1 then undef else r[j])
)
which is not strongly local.
Example 8. We consider a very slight variant of the example of a job hiring
process in a company presented in the paper. The human resource (HR) branch
of the company stores in its catalog database information relevant to the process.
Specifically, the company’s catalog Cat is composed of the following relations:
– JobCategory(Jcid : jobcatID) is used to access different types of jobs that
are available in the company ;
– User(Uid : userID, Name : StringName, Age : NumAge) stores data about
users registered to the company website, who might be potentially interested
in job positions offered by the company. ⊳
To manage information about submitted applications, including data on
users, the score they receive after having been interviewed and their el-
igibility, the company employs repository Rep that consists of one rela-
tion Application(Jcid : jobcatID, Uid : userID, Name : StringName, Age :
NumAge, Score : NumScore, Eligible : BoolString) that stores all the informa-
tion. Notice that NumScore contains 100 values in the range (0, 101), where a
score from 1 to 100 indicates the actual one assigned after evaluating the ap-
plication. For readability, we use the usual predicates <, >, and = to compare
variables of type NumScore: this is syntactic sugar and does not require to in-
troduce rigid predicates in our framework.
Since the job posting is created using a dedicated company’s portal, the in-
formation related to this posting does not have to be stored persistently and
thus can be maintained just for a given case. To represent it we use a set of
case variables VC , where jcid : jobcatID references a job type, uid : userID user’s
identifier together with her name name : StringName and age age : NumAge,
a user that wins the position winner : userID together with the check of
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her eligibility result : BoolString. Moreover, we use three more auxiliary vari-
ables: qualif : Bool identifies whether a currently selected applicant is quali-
fied or not, exists eligible : Bool indicates successful (or not) termination of
the eligible candidate selection process and tPassed : StringDate indicates the
time passed from the moment when company started receiving applications
for the open position. In the following we described data updates issued by
tasks and events in out process model. The execution starts by receiving a new
job posting that generates a new posting identifier using the following effect:
Eff (Job posted) = {SET jcid′ = idj}. As soon the job offer has been published,
the company starts a process of receiving and evaluating applications. Such pro-
cess runs until a qualified candidate is found: nevertheless, if no qualified candi-
date is found after a non-deterministically assigned deadline has been reached,
the process is interrupted anyway. In our case the deadline is modeled using an
error event with effect Eff (ErrorEvent) = {SETtPassed′ = 1Month}.
Whenever a new application is received, the Application received event gets
triggered and assigns user data that came together with the application to des-
ignated case variables using the following effect:
Eff (Application received) =


SETuid′ = idu,
SETname′ = n,
SETage′ = a


Next, a CV attached to the application undergoes a preliminary evaluation
with the sole purpose of detecting a candidate that may be a perfect fit for the
position, and thus should immediately win the competition. This is modeled
by the Evaluate CV task, s.t. G(Evaluate CV) = true9 and Eff (Evaluate CV) =
{SETqualif ′ := o}.
If a candidate is not perfectly apt for the position in absentia, we proceed
directly to the thorough evaluation of the application followed by the process
immediately recording the interview result using the Evaluate Application task.
This task requires a precondition on data updates, i.e.
G(Evaluate Application) =


(exists eligible = true ∧ 0 < s < 101 ∧ y = true)∨
∨ (exists eligible = false ∧ 80 < s < 101 ∧ y = true)∨
∨ (exists eligible = false ∧ 0 < s ≤ 80 ∧ y = false)


and its update inserts a new tuple to the process repository with a score s
such that 0 < s < 101:
Eff (Evaluate Application) =
{
INSERT(jcid, uid, name, age, s, undef)
INTOApplicationAND SETexists eligibleTOy
}
Notice that the the case variable exists eligible becomes true in case at least
an applicant is evaluated with score greater that 80.
9 Hereinafter we shall avoid putting explicitly trivial (i.e., containing only true) pre-
conditions.
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In case a candidate is considered to be perfectly qualified for the position, it
immediately gets considered as a winner of the selection process. Such a function-
ality is carried over by the Assign Winner task that simply assigns the winners
user identifier to the dedicated case variable:
Eff (Assign Winner) =


SETwinner′ = uid,
SET result′ = qualified
SET tPassed′ = LessThan1Month


If the process of the application evaluation has ended up due to the deadline,
the process runs a task that decides on the eligible candidates among all those
that have sent applications. Here as eligible we consider only those candidates
whose interview score is greater than 80, whereas others are regarded as not
eligible. This is done using the Decide Eligible Candidate task with the following
update:
Eff (Decide Eligible Candidate) =


UPDATEApplication(JCID,UID,N,A, S,Elig)
IFS > 80
THENApplication(JCID,UID,N,A, S,′ eligible′)
ELSEApplication(JCID,UID,N,A, S,′ noteligible′)


Note that the if-then-else clause allows us to perform a sort of a bulky update
over the repository relation Application by changing the eligibility status of its
entries.
If case there is at least one eligible candidate, she can be selected as
a winner. This is done by the Select Winner task that nondeterministi-
cally selects one such candidate from Application (i.e., G(Select Winner) =
Application(Jcid, Uid,Name,Age, Score, Eligible) ∧ Eligible =′ eligible′)
and moves her data to the case variables:
Eff (Select Winner) =


DEL (Jcid, Uid,Name,Age,Eligible)FROMApplication
TO(jcid, uid, name, age, result)
AND SETtPassed = 1MonthPlus1Week
∧ qualif ′ = false ∧ exists eligible′ = undef


Here we also take into account that in order to decide on the eligibility of
candidates as well as a winning candidate, the HR staff of the company may
require some time. This is duly represented by updating the amount of time
passed since the beginning of the candidate selection process.
At last, when a winning candidate has been selected, the HR office prepares a
official offer that is then sent to the winner. In our model this is represented with
the Make Offer activity that does not issue any updates on the data component
(i.e., Eff (Make Offer) = true).
We analyze four examples of reachability queries, taken from the mcmt spec-
ifications that we tested in our experimental evaluation: we focus on 1-case safety
verification.
The first query expresses that the job hiring process has completed, i.e. it
has reached its final state: the tool returns UNSAFE (since it exists a sequence
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of configurations starting from the initial states to the final one), as expected.
Formally, we have:
∃i:PIindex
(
lifecycleProcess[i] = completed
)
The second query formalizes the situation where, after the evaluation of an
application (i.e., EvaluateApplication is completed), there exists at least an ap-
plicant with score greater than 0: the tool returns UNSAFE, as expected. Formally,
we have:
∃i:PIindex
(
lifecycleEvaluateApplication[i] = completed∧
∧ Application(Jcid, Uid,Name,Age, Score, Eligible)∧ Score > 0
)
The third query represents the configuration of the system in which a winner
has been selected after deadline (i.e., SelectWinner is completed), but the case
variable result witnesses that the winner was a not eligible candidate: the tool
returns SAFE (since this configuration is not reachable from the initial states),
as expected. Formally, we have
∃i:PIindex
(
lifecycleSelectWinner[i] = completed∧ result[i] = noteligible
)
The final query describes the configuration in which, after the evaluation of
an application, there exists an applicant with score greater than 100: the tool
returns SAFE, as expected. Formally, we have:
∃i:PIindex
(
lifecycleEvaluateApplication[i] = completed∧
∧ Application(Jcid, Uid,Name,Age, Score, Eligible)∧ Score > 100
)
All these queries has been checked running MCMT over the running example.
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